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Evenwel v. Abbott 
14-940 
Ruling Below: Evenwel v. Perry, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156192 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2014) 
In 2013, the Texas Legislature enacted a State Senate map creating districts that, while roughly 
equal in terms of total population, grossly malapportioned voters. Appellants, who live in Senate 
districts significantly overpopulated with voters, brought a one-person, one--vote challenge, 
which the three-judge district court below dismissed for failure to state a claim. The district court 
held that Appellants' constitutional challenge is a judicially unreviewable political question.   
Question Presented: Whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s “one-person, one-vote” principle 
creates a judicially enforceable right ensuring that the districting process does not deny voters 
and equal vote. 
 
Sue EVENWEL and Edward Pfenninger 
Plaintiffs 
v.  
Rick PERRY, in his official capacity as Governor of Texas, and Nandita Berry, in her 
official capacity as Texas Secretary of State 
Defendants 
The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Austin Division 
Decided on November 5, 2014 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted] 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND 
ORDER 
After this case was filed raising allegations 
implicating a statewide redistricting scheme, 
Fifth Circuit Chief Judge Carl Stewart 
appointed this three-judge panel to preside 
over the case. This court has federal-question 
jurisdiction. Before the court are the 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted. The court heard oral argument on 
the motion on June 25, 2014. Also pending 
are Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment 
and a motion to intervene filed by the Texas 
Senate Hispanic Caucus, and others. For the 
following reasons we GRANT Defendants’ 
Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, we 
DISMISS Plaintiffs’ motion for summary 
judgment and the motion to intervene. 
I. Background 
The Texas Legislature is required by the 
Texas Constitution to reapportion its senate 
districts during the first regular session after 
the federal decennial census. It is undisputed 
that, after publication of the 2010 census, the 
Texas Legislature created redistricting 
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PLANS148 and passed it as part of Senate 
Bill 31, which Texas Governor Rick Perry 
signed into law June 17, 2011. A separate 
three-judge panel of the United States 
District Court for the Western District of 
Texas found that there was a not insubstantial 
claim that PLANS148 violated the federal 
Voting Rights Act, and issued an interim 
plan, PLANS172, for the 2012 primary 
elections. Thereafter, the Texas Legislature 
adopted and Governor Perry signed into law 
PLANS172, as the official Texas Senate 
districting plan. 
On April 21, 2014, Plaintiffs Sue Evenwel 
and Edward Pfenninger filed suit against 
Governor Perry and Texas Secretary of State 
Nandita Berry in their official capacities. 
Plaintiffs allege that they are registered 
voters who actively vote in Texas senate 
elections. Evenwel lives in Titus County, part 
of Texas Senate District 1, and Pfenninger 
lives in Montgomery County, part of Texas 
Senate District 4.  
Plaintiffs allege that, in enacting PLANS172, 
the Texas Legislature apportioned senatorial 
districts to achieve a relatively equal number 
of individuals based on total population 
alone. Plaintiffs concede that PLANS172’s 
total deviation from ideal, using total 
population, is 8.04%. The crux of the dispute 
is Plaintiff’s allegation that the districts vary 
widely in population when measured using 
various voter-population metrics. They 
further allege that it is possible to create 
districts that contain both relatively equal 
numbers of voter population and relatively 
equal numbers of total population. They 
conclude that PLANS172 violates the one-
person, one-vote principle of the Equal 
Protection Clause by not apportioning 
districts to equalize both total population and 
voter population. 
Defendants’ motion to dismiss argues that 
there is no legal basis for Plaintiffs’ claim that 
PLANS 172 is unconstitutional for not 
apportioning districs pursuant to Plaintiffs’ 
proffered scheme. 
II. Standard of Review 
Rule 12(b)(6) allows a court to dismiss a 
complaint for “failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted.” The inquiry 
under Rule 12(b)(6) is whether, accepting all 
facts alleged in the complaint as true, the 
complaint states a plausible claim for relief. 
Importantly, legal conclusions need not be 
accepted as true. Under Rule 12(b)(6), 
dismissal is proper if a claim is based on an 
ultimately unavailing legal theory. 
III. Discussion 
A state’s congressional-apportionment plan 
may be challenged under the Equal 
Protection Clause in either two ways: (1) that 
the plan does not achieve substantial equality 
of population among districts when measured 
using a permissible population base 
measured; or (2) that the plan is created in a 
manner that is otherwise invidiously 
discriminatory against a protected group. 
Plaintiffs’ challenge falls only in the first 
category, so we address that theory 
Here Plaintiffs must prove that the districting 
plan violates the Equal Protection Clause by 
demonstrating that the plan fails to achieve 
“substantial equality of population”—what 
Plaintiffs refer to as the “one-person, one-
 54 
vote” principle. Under this approach, 
absolute mathematical equality is not 
necessary, as some deviation is permissible in 
order to achieve other legitimate state 
interests. Furthermore, minor deviations, 
defined as “a maximum population deviation 
under 10%,” fail to make out a prima facie 
case under this theory. 
In applying this framework, the Supreme 
Court has generally used total population as 
the metric of comparison. However, the 
Court has never held that a certain metric 
(including total population) must be 
employed as the appropriate metric. Instead, 
the Court has explained that the limit on the 
metric employed is that it must not itself be 
the result of a discriminatory choice and that, 
so long as the legislature’s choice is not 
constitutionally forbidden, the federal courts 
must respect the legislature’s prerogative. 
Plaintiffs do not allege that the 
apportionment base employed by Texas 
involves a choice the Constitution forbids. 
Accordingly, Texas’s “compliance with the 
rule established in Reynolds v. Sims is to be 
measured thereby.” Measuring it in this 
manner, the Plaintiffs fail to allege facts that 
demonstrate a prima facie case against Texas 
under Reynolds v. Sims. The Plaintiffs do not 
allege that PLANS172 fails to achieve 
substantial population equality employing 
Texas’s metric of total population; to the 
contrary, they admit that Texas redrew its 
senate districts to equalize total population, 
and they present facts showing PLANS172’s 
total deviation from ideal, using total 
population, is 8.04%. Given that this falls 
below 10%, the Plaintiffs’ own pleading 
shows that they cannot make out a prima 
facie case of a violation of the one-person, 
one-vote principle. Accordingly, they fail to 
state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted. 
Plaintiffs attempt to avoid this result by 
relying upon a theory never before accepted 
by the Supreme Court or any circuit court: 
that the metric of apportionment employed 
by Texas (total population) results in an 
unconstitutional apportionment because it 
does not achieve equality as measured by 
Plaintiffs’ chosen metric-voter population. 
Plaintiffs argue that their theory is consonant 
with Burns, in which the Supreme Court 
faced a related argument. Burns involved a 
challenge to Hawaii’s apportionment on the 
basis of registered-voter data. Although 
Hawaii achieved substantial equality using its 
chosen metric, there were large disparities 
between the districts when measured using 
total population. The Court began by 
explaining that Equal Protection Clause 
jurisprudence has “carefully left open the 
question what population” base was to be 
used in achieving substantial equality of 
population. The Court then stated that a 
state’s choice of apportionment base is not 
restrained beyond the requirement that it not 
involve an unconstitutional inclusion or 
exclusion of a protected group. The Court 
explained that this amount of flexibility is left 
to state legislatures because the decision 
whether to exclude or include individuals 
who are ineligible to vote from an 
apportionment base “involves choices about 
the nature of representation with which we 
have been shown no constitutionally founded 
reason to interfere.” In other words, it is not 
the role of the federal courts to impose a 
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“better” apportionment method on a state 
legislature if that state’s chosen method does 
not itself violate the Constitution. 
Working from this starting point, the 
Supreme Court highlighted the concerns 
raised by using registered voters as the 
apportionment base as opposed to state 
citizenship or another permissible population 
base. It then held that Hawaii’s 
“apportionment satisfies the Equal Protection 
Clause only because on this record it was 
found to have produced a distribution of 
legislators not substantially different from 
that which would have resulted from the use 
of a permissible population basis.” The 
permissible population base the Supreme 
Court considered in Burns was state 
citizenship. The Court was careful to note 
that its holding was limited to the specific 
facts before it and should not be seen as an 
endorsement of using registered voters as an 
apportionment base. 
Plaintiffs characterize Burns as the Court 
“ma[king] clear that the right of voters to an 
equally weighted vote is the relevant 
constitutional principle and that any interest 
in proportional representation must be 
subordinated to that right.” Quite the  
contrary, the Supreme Court recognized that 
the precise question presented here—whether 
to “include or exclude” groups of individuals 
ineligible to vote from an apportionment 
base—“involves choices about the nature of 
representation” which the Court has “been 
shown no constitutionally founded reason to 
interfere.” Furthermore, the Supreme Court 
indicated problems in using one of the 
Plaintiffs’ proposed metrics—registered 
voters—and ultimately measured the 
constitutionality of Hawaii’s apportionment 
using the permissible population base of state 
citizenship. We conclude that Plaintiffs are 
asking us to “interfere” with a choice that the 
Supreme Court has unambiguously left to the 
states absent the unconstitutional inclusion or 
exclusion of specific protected groups of 
individuals. We decline the invitation to do 
so. 
IV. Conclusion 
The Plaintiffs have failed to pleas facts that 
state an equal Protection Clause violation 
under the recognized means for showing 
unconstitutionality under that clause. Further, 
Plaintiffs’ proposed theory for proving an 
Equal Protection Clause violation is contrary 
to the reasoning in Burns and has never 
gained acceptance in the law. For these 
reasons, we conclude that Plaintiffs’ 
complaint fails to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted. 
Accordingly it is ORDERED that 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is 
GRANTED and Plaintiffs’ claims against the 
Defendants are DISMISSED WITH 
PREJUDICE. 
It is further ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ 
motion for summary judgment and the 
motion to intervene are DISMISSED. 
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“Supreme Court Agrees to Settle Meaning of ‘One-Person One-
Vote’” 
The New York Times 
Adam Liptak 
May 26, 2015 
 
The Supreme Court agreed on Tuesday to 
hear a case that will answer a long-contested 
question about a bedrock principle of the 
American political system: the meaning of 
“one person one vote.” 
 
The court’s ruling, expected in 2016, could 
be immensely consequential. Should the 
court agree with the two Texas voters who 
brought the case, its ruling would shift 
political power from cities to rural areas, a 
move that would benefit Republicans. 
 
The court has never resolved whether voting 
districts should have the same number of 
people, or the same number of eligible voters. 
Counting all people amplifies the voting 
power of places with large numbers of 
residents who cannot vote legally, including 
immigrants who are here legally but are not 
citizens, illegal immigrants, children and 
prisoners. Those places tend to be urban and 
to vote Democratic. 
 
A ruling that districts must be based on equal 
numbers of voters would move political 
power away from cities, with their many 
immigrants and children, and toward older 
and more homogeneous rural areas. 
 
Such a decision, said Richard H. Pildes, a law 
professor at New York University, “would be 
most significant in border states, like 
California, Texas, Arizona and Nevada, that 
have the largest proportions of noncitizens.” 
 
The Supreme Court over the past nearly 25 
years has turned away at least three similar 
challenges, and many election law experts 
expressed surprise that the justices agreed to 
hear this one. But since Chief Justice John G. 
Roberts has led the court, it has been active 
in other voting cases. 
 
In 2013, in Shelby County v. Holder, a closely 
divided court effectively struck down the 
heart of the Voting Rights Act. 
 
The new case, Evenwel v. Abbott, No. 14-
940, concerns state and local voting districts. 
But “the logic of the decision in Evenwel will 
likely carry over to congressional 
redistricting,” said Richard L. Hasen, a law 
professor at the University of California, 
Irvine. 
 
The case, a challenge to voting districts for 
the Texas Senate, was brought by two voters, 
Sue Evenwel and Edward Pfenninger. They 
are represented by the Project on Fair 
Representation, the small conservative 
advocacy group that successfully mounted 
the earlier challenge to the Voting Rights 
Act. It is also behind a pending challenge to 
affirmative action in admissions at the 
University of Texas at Austin. 
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In the new case, the challengers said their 
voting power had been diluted. “There are 
voters or potential voters in Texas whose 
Senate votes are worth approximately one 
and one-half times that of appellants,” their 
brief said. 
 
In a statement issued after the Supreme Court 
accepted their case, Ms. Evenwel and Mr. 
Pfenninger said they “hoped that the outcome 
of our lawsuit will compel Texas to equalize 
the number of eligible voters in each district.” 
 
Professor Hasen said their lawsuit was in 
tension with some conservative principles. 
 
“It is highly ironic that conservatives, who 
usually support respect for precedents and 
states’ rights, are bringing a case that if 
successful will not only upset decades-old 
case law but also restrict the kind of 
representation states may choose,” he said. 
 
In November, a three-judge panel of the 
Federal District Court in Austin dismissed 
the case, saying that “the Supreme Court has 
generally used total population as the metric 
of comparison.” At the same time, the panel 
said, the Supreme Court has never required 
any particular standard. The choice, the panel 
said, belongs to the states. 
 
A 1964 Supreme Court decision, Reynolds v. 
Sims, ruled that voting districts must contain 
very close to the same number of people. But 
the court did not say which people count. 
 
Most state and local governments draw 
districts based on total population. If people 
who were ineligible to vote were evenly 
distributed, the difference between counting 
all people or counting only eligible voters 
would not matter. But demographic patterns 
vary widely. 
 
Federal appeals courts have uniformly ruled 
that counting everyone is permissible, and 
one court has indicated that it is required. 
 
In the process, though, several judges have 
acknowledged that the Supreme Court’s 
decisions provide support for both 
approaches. The federal appeals court in New 
Orleans said the issue “presents a close 
question,” partly because the Supreme Court 
had been “somewhat evasive in regard to 
which population must be equalized.” 
 
Judge Alex Kozinski, in a partial dissent from 
a decision of the federal appeals court in San 
Francisco, said there were respectable 
arguments on both sides. 
 
On one theory, he said, counting everyone 
ensures “representational equality,” with 
elected officials tending to the interests of the 
same number of people, whether they are 
voters or not. 
 
On the other hand, he said, counting only 
eligible voters vindicates the principle that 
voters “hold the ultimate political power in 
our democracy.” He concluded that the 
Supreme Court’s decisions generally 
supported the second view. 
 
Even if counting only adult citizens is the 
correct approach, there are practical 
obstacles. “A constitutional rule requiring 
equal numbers of citizens would necessitate 
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a different kind of census than the one 
currently conducted,” Nathaniel Persily, a 
law professor at Stanford, wrote in 2011 in 
the Cardozo Law Review. 
 
For now, he said, “the only relevant data 
available from the census gives ballpark 
figures, at best, and misleading and confusing 
estimates at worst.” 
 
In 2001, the Supreme Court turned down an 
opportunity to decide the question, in another 
case from Texas. 
 
Justice Clarence Thomas objected. “We have 
never determined the relevant ‘population’ 
that states and localities must equally 
distribute among their districts,” he wrote. 
 
“The one-person-one-vote principle may, in 
the end, be of little consequence if we decide 
that each jurisdiction can choose its own 
measure of population,” Justice Thomas 
added. “But as long as we sustain the one-
person-one-vote principle, we have an 
obligation to explain to states and localities 
what it actually means.” 
 
In the new case, the Supreme Court may 
decide that states can determine for 
themselves which standard to use. Even such 
a ruling could have a major impact, Professor 
Pildes said. 
 
“If the court leaves it to states to decide, we 
could see the politics of immigration come to 
affect the politics of redistricting even more,” 
he said. “State legislatures would be given a 
green light to locate more power or less 
power in areas that have large geographic 
concentrations of noncitizens. Those areas 
would have more power if the rule is equality 
of residents and less power if it’s equality of 
eligible voters.” 
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“Only Voters Count?” 
Slate 
Richard Hasen 
May 26, 2015 
 
For the second time in a year, the Supreme 
Court has agreed to wade into an election 
case at the urging of conservatives. In both 
cases it has done so despite the issue 
appearing to be settled by long-standing 
precedent. In a case expected to be decided 
next month, Arizona State Legislature v. 
Arizona Independent Redistricting 
Commission, conservatives asked the court to 
bar states from using independent 
redistricting commissions to draw 
congressional lines.  
 
In a case the court agreed to hear Tuesday, 
Evenwel v. Abbott, conservatives asked the 
court to require states to draw their legislative 
district lines in a particular way: Rather than 
considering the total population in each 
district, conservatives argue, the lines should 
instead divide districts according to the 
number of people registered or eligible to 
vote. Most states use total population for 
drawing districts, which includes 
noncitizens, children, felons, and others 
ineligible to vote. 
 
In both Supreme Court cases, there is great 
irony in the fact that they are being brought 
by conservatives, who usually claim to 
respect precedents and states’ rights. The 
challengers are not only asking the court to 
revisit issues that seemed to be settled by 
decades-old precedent. If successful, these 
cases will undermine federalism by limiting 
states’ rights to design their own political 
systems. 
 
A ruling favorable to conservatives in the 
Evenwel case, especially if extended to 
congressional redistricting, could shift more 
power to Republicans, who are more likely to 
live in areas with high concentrations of 
voters. 
 
The Arizona State Legislature case concerns 
the question of who gets to set the rules for 
congressional redistricting. The 
Constitution’s election clause gives that 
power to state “legislatures,” subject to be 
overridden by Congress. The question is how 
literally to take the word legislature and 
whether only the state legislature qualifies. 
Supreme Court precedents going back to the 
beginning of the 20th century read the term 
broadly to include, for instance, redistricting 
plans approved by the voters. Although the 
issue looked settled before the Supreme 
Court took the Arizona case, there is now a 
real chance the court will hold that removing 
the legislature from redistricting decisions is 
unconstitutional. 
 
That decision would be unfortunate. In places 
like California, for example, voters approved 
independent redistricting commissions as a 
way to take self-interest and partisanship out 
of the redistricting process. This should be a 
legitimate choice for states to make, 
especially in the eyes of those committed to 
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states’ rights. Yet the court may soon take 
this important option off the table for 
congressional districts. It may also bar the 
use of voter initiatives to make other changes 
in congressional elections, such as mandating 
open primaries. 
 
Perhaps even more is at stake in the Evenwel 
case, from Texas. A ruling that states may not 
draw legislative district lines taking total 
population into account will benefit rural 
voters over urban voters, and that will benefit 
Republicans over Democrats. Urban areas 
are much more likely to be filled with people 
who cannot vote: noncitizens (especially 
Latinos), released felons whose voting rights 
have not been restored, and children. With 
districts redrawn using only voters rather 
than all people, there will be more 
Republican districts. 
 
Evenwel involves the issue of state legislature 
redistricting, but you can bet that if the 
challengers are successful in this case, they 
will argue for the same principle to be applied 
to the drawing of national congressional 
districts. It is not clear whether the ruling 
would apply to congressional districts, 
because the one-person, one-vote principle 
for congressional districts has a different 
source in the Constitution (Article I) than the 
14th Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, 
which applies to state legislatures. But 
logically, the two cases are likely to be 
treated the same, and the result could be more 
congressional districts tending Republican, 
helping Republicans keep their advantage in 
the U.S. House of Representatives. 
 
In Evenwel, once again, the issue appeared to 
be settled. Back in 1966 the Supreme Court 
considered the issue in a case called Burns v. 
Richardson, holding that Hawaii could 
choose total population or total voters as its 
method of drawing district lines. The court’s 
point about why this was the state’s decision 
celebrated the values of federalism: “The 
decision to include or exclude any such group 
involves choices about the nature of 
representation with which we have been 
shown no constitutionally founded reason to 
interfere.” Although courts have periodically 
been asked to revisit the question, Adam 
Liptak reports that all the courts of appeal to 
consider the question have ruled that total 
population is a permissible basis for drawing 
district lines. And it is not even clear we have 
good measures of citizen population, 
meaning there could be great errors in how 
newly ordered redistricting following 
Evenwel would be conducted. We are also not 
sure if district lines would be based on the 
number of actual or eligible voters, and that 
alone could make a big difference. 
 
The conservatives behind Evenwel don’t 
seem bothered much by the intrusion on 
states’ rights that a decision in their favor 
would engender. That’s because they are 
motivated more by the fact that noncitizens 
are getting representation, and in their belief 
that this is “diluting” the voting power of 
citizens. They are the same people who 
backed attacks on affirmative action at the 
Supreme Court in the Fisher v. University of 
Texas at Austin case and successfully got the 
Supreme Court to strike down a key portion 
of the Voting Rights Act in the Shelby County 
v. Holder case. 
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It is an agenda not about states’ rights but 
about getting the Supreme Court to force 
states to empower conservatives and force 
onto all of us the theories of representation 
and power they envision. 
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“Misguided Hysteria Over Evenwel v. Abbott” 
SCOTUSBlog 
Richard Pildes 
July 30, 2015 
As soon as the Court decided to hear 
Evenwel, a barely suppressed anger emerged 
in many quarters, on grounds of both process 
and substance. On process: how dare the 
Court address this issue, when a 1966 
precedent seemingly settled the issue, and no 
conflict existed in the lower courts, to boot. 
On substance: how disturbing for the Court to 
consider any change in the legal status quo, 
in which states are perfectly free to define the 
“one person, one vote” baseline (total 
population or eligible voters) for themselves. 
But on both process and substance, these 
complaints and anxieties are misplaced and 
misguided. 
The Court is right to confront this issue. And 
more importantly, the most likely outcome is 
that the Court will either re-affirm the status 
quo or conclude that equal protection 
requires states to use population, not voters, 
as the measure of political equality – a 
possibility almost none of the commentary, 
thus far, seems to recognize.   
Let’s start with the substantive issue. The 
issue is whether “one person, one vote” is a 
principle of “representational equality” or 
one of “electoral equality.” Once the Court 
fully grapples with the issue, I consider it 
extremely unlikely a majority will conclude 
that the constitutional metric must be voters. 
Four reasons of principle and practicality, at 
least, lead to this conclusion. First, states 
have the power to extend even the right to 
vote itself to non-citizens; in the mid-
nineteenth century, for example, non-citizens 
typically were given the right to vote (outside 
the Northeast), as Alex Keyssar’s leading 
history, The Right to Vote: The Contested 
History of Democracy in the United States, 
chronicles. States are not required, of course, 
to extend the vote to non-citizens, but doing 
so is constitutionally permissible and does 
not dilute the vote of citizens, if this historical 
experience provides guidance. . If states can 
constitutionally include non-citizens in the 
population of eligible voters, it would be 
incongruous to conclude states lack similar 
discretion to include them in the population 
that counts for designing election districts. 
Second, the Constitution’s text itself 
recognizes the validity of basing political 
representation on persons, rather than only 
voters. In Article I, Section 2 of the original 
Constitution, the apportionment among the 
states of members to Congress was based on 
the number of “persons”; when the 
Fourteenth Amendment revised the 
apportionment provisions to reflect the end of 
slavery, the same judgment was again made 
that political representation of the states in 
the House should be based on “the whole 
numbers of persons in each State.” Indeed, 
Congress specifically rejected proposals to 
base apportionment on eligible voters 
instead. The legitimacy of basing political 
representation on population, not voters 
alone, is embodied in these provisions. These 
provisions might not require states to 
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equalize population across districts, but they 
strongly suggest using “persons” as the 
relevant baseline is constitutionally 
permissible. 
Third, the practice of all states for several 
decades has been to use persons, not voters 
(whether voting-age population, citizen 
voting-age population, or eligible voters) as 
the redistricting metric. Both at the time of 
the Founding and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and throughout American 
history, many states have used population as 
the standard. To the extent these political 
practices can “liquidate” or settle the 
Constitution’s meaning, they confirm that 
population is, at the least, a constitutionally 
permissible metric. In addition, the fact that 
states uniformly use population will make the 
Court realize just how destabilizing it would 
be to impose a sudden new constitutional rule 
requiring states to equalize the number of 
eligible voters across districts, even when 
doing so creates significant inequalities in the 
number of people across districts. Fourth, and 
finally, is the technocratic and practical 
problem: since the Census no longer asks 
respondents whether they are citizens, a 
constitutional requirement that states 
equalize the number of eligible voters across 
districts would be difficult for States and 
courts to administer.   Citizenship data would 
have to come from the ACS rolling-survey 
data sets; others have pointed out the 
difficulties with basing once-a-decade 
redistricting on this data (should we ever 
have a system of automatic voter registration 
for all eligible voters when they come of age, 
this technocratic issue would evaporate). 
So for all these reasons, the most interesting 
question in Evenwel is not actually whether 
the Constitution requires “electoral equality.” 
That the Court would reach this conclusion is 
highly unlikely. Once the Court rejects this 
conclusion, the more interesting question is 
whether the Court will remain content with 
the principle that the Constitution gives the 
states discretion to choose either “electoral 
equality” or “representational equality” as the 
proper interpretation of the Equal Protection 
Clause. Remarkably, the Court has only 
focused on this substantive question at all in 
one case, Burns v. Richardson (1966), 
decided at the dawn of the reapportionment 
revolution; Burns concluded states could 
make either choice. Now that the issue is 
back before the Court nearly fifty years later, 
the jurisprudential issue is whether all the 
developments in redistricting and voting-
rights law in those intervening years should 
lead the Court to conclude that equal 
protection requires a uniform understanding 
concerning the correct population measure 
that must be used. (My co-authored 
casebook, The Law of Democracy, asks 
whether “Burns survives the subsequent 
development of voting rights law.”) If the 
Court does conclude that a uniform 
understanding of “equality” is required, the 
most likely outcome is representational 
equality – equality of the total number of 
persons across districts. 
The argument for a uniform understanding of 
“equality” is strong, as a matter of both 
constitutional principle and pragmatic 
judicial implementation of the Constitution. 
In the apportionment cases, the Court has 
spoken eloquently many times about the 
importance of political equality in designing 
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districts – but equality of whom, people or 
voters?   If the basic principle is of such 
constitutional magnitude, there is much force 
to the conclusion that the Court has an 
obligation to specify equality of whom, or 
equality with respect to what value or 
principle. The choice between electoral 
equality and representational quality is not a 
fine-grained technical detail of how to 
implement the Equal Protection Clause. That 
choice is a fundamental, categorical one 
about the essential interpretation and 
meaning of equal protection in the context of 
designing our basic democratic institutions. 
Does the clause require that all persons in a 
jurisdiction (non-eligible voters as well as 
voters) have roughly equal political 
representation? Or does it require that all 
eligible voters have a roughly equal voting 
power? Those are fundamentally different-
in-kind understandings of equal protection 
that flow from the Court’s “one person, one 
vote” jurisprudence – precisely the kind of 
question, in other contexts, to which the 
Court would provide the answer. 
The reason the Court gave in Burns for 
leaving this choice instead to state discretion 
was that the decision of which groups to 
include in the baseline for districting 
“involves choices about the nature of 
representation with which we have been 
shown no constitutionally founded reason to 
interfere.” But in the context of the 
Reapportionment Cases, this explanation is 
off-key. After all, it was the vehement 
position of the dissenting Justices in these 
cases, such as Justices Harlan and 
Frankfurter, that the Court should not get 
involved in these issues at all because to get 
involved was to require the Court to choose 
among competing theories of political 
representation. 
The Court crossed that Rubicon when it 
decided that equal protection did not permit 
representation to be based on geographic 
units, such as towns and counties, and did 
require it to be based on equal numbers of 
sentient beings (people or voters). Having 
completely redefined the basis of political 
representation the Constitution requires, the 
Court’s reticence about not wanting to 
choose between competing theories of 
representation when it comes to voters or 
people rings hollow. Instead, Burns reads like 
a tentative, interim, and transitional decision 
in the early stages of working out the 
meaning of the Reapportionment Cases. 
Decided only two months after argument, 
Burns arose with elections imminently 
pending and dealt with what was only an 
interim districting plan; in other words, the 
stakes were low, the need for an immediate 
decision pressing. 
With the much fuller development of the 
“one person, one vote” doctrine in the fifty 
years since, it is not obvious the Court will be 
comfortable with leaving states as much 
discretion to choose “equality of whom” in 
districting. And given the intensity of today’s 
political conflicts over immigration, it is not 
difficult to imagine those politics coming to 
further poison redistricting, if states are free 
to move back and forth between using voters 
or persons as the measure of district equality. 
Given how aware the Court is of the extreme 
partisan polarization of our era, and how that 
polarization plays out already in districting, 
the Justices might conclude that strong 
pragmatic reasons further support adoption of 
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a uniform principle concerning district 
“equality.” 
The courts of appeals, in the three major 
cases raising this issue, have all explained 
why representational equality is the better 
interpretation of the principles underlying the 
“one person, one vote” doctrine. But all have 
recognized that the issue is important and the 
question close. In Evenwel, this issue arose 
for the first time in the Court’s non-
discretionary appellate jurisdiction; the Court 
was right to take the case, rather than 
summarily affirm, and to give this issue the 
attention it deserves. Texas, as the defendant-
appellee, will only ask the Court to affirm the 
status quo and let Texas (and other States) 
continue to have discretion to choose whether 
to create district equality between persons or 
voters. Texas will succeed to at least that 
extent, I believe. But now that the Court will 
be forced to confront these issues, the Court 
might well conclude that it has an obligation 
to decide whether there is a right answer to 
the question under the Equal Protection 
Clause of “equality of whom” and that the 
better answer is equality of political 
representation for all persons. 
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“One Person, One Vote?” 
The Atlantic 
Garrett Epps 
May 31, 2015 
 
“Equality of representation in the legislature 
is a first principle of liberty,” John Adams 
wrote in 1776. 
 
Most Americans would agree. But does 
“equality of representation” mean equal 
numbers of people—or equal numbers of 
voters 
  
That question is raised by the Court’s 
decision Monday to hear the case of Evenwel 
v. Abbott. Evenwel is a challenge to the Texas 
Legislature’s plan for state Senate districts. 
The appellants are registered voters from 
Senate districts that have significantly more 
eligible voters than some others. The 
legislature’s districts vary from each other in 
raw population by less than 10 percent; but in 
their “citizen voting-age population,” or 
CVAP, the variation can be as high as 50 
percent.   
 
In their appeal to the Court, the aggrieved 
voters note that “in Texas, large numbers of 
non-voters swell the population of certain 
geographic locations.” The Cato Institute, in 
a brief urging the Court to take the case, is 
more specific: Evenwel is about race and 
national origin. Under the current basis, the 
Cato brief says, “a relatively small 
constituency of eligible Hispanic voters ... 
have their votes ‘over-weighted’ and ‘over-
valuated,’ effectively diluting the votes of 
eligible voters” in districts with fewer 
Latinos.  Latino voters thus have 
“disproportionate power.” Though the brief 
doesn’t mention this, redrawing lines on 
CVAP would produce districts that are older, 
whiter, richer, and more likely to vote 
Republican. 
 
Throughout much of our history, states got to 
apportion their legislatures any way they 
wanted. But in a 1964 case called Reynolds v. 
Sims, the Warren Court proclaimed that “as a 
basic constitutional standard, the Equal 
Protection Clause requires that the seats in 
both houses of a bicameral state legislature 
must be apportioned on a population basis.” 
The Court’s explanation, however, created a 
lasting confusion between population and 
voters; “an individual’s right to vote for state 
legislators,” it said, “is unconstitutionally 
impaired when its weight is in a substantial 
fashion diluted when compared with votes of 
citizens living in other parts of the State.” 
This and later decisions spawned the 
shorthand phrase, “one person one vote.” 
 
In a 1966 case called Burns v. Richardson, 
the Court approved a temporary Hawaii 
districting plan based on the number of 
eligible voters; the state argued it needed to 
use that basis, rather than population, because 
of the large number of military personnel 
moving in and out of the state. Justice 
William Brennan’s majority opinion 
approved Hawaii’s temporary plan “only 
because” it “produced a distribution of 
legislators not substantially different from 
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that which would have resulted from the use 
of a permissible population basis.” 
 
Since then, the Court has formally left the 
population-basis decision to each individual 
state.  In 2001, the Court denied review in a 
case presenting this issue. Justice Clarence 
Thomas dissented from that denial, arguing 
that the Court should decide the issue rather 
than leaving it to states.  “The one-person, 
one-vote principle may, in the end, be of little 
consequence if we decide that each 
jurisdiction can choose its own measure of 
population,” he wrote. 
 
As the Cato brief makes clear, the hidden 
issue in Evenwel is Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act. It forbids a state from adopting 
any “standard, practice, or procedure” that 
offers racial minorities “less opportunity than 
other members of the electorate to participate 
in the political process and to elect 
representatives of their choice.” It’s hard to 
generalize, but states with large Latino 
populations use census figures on raw 
population—including racial makeup—to 
draw districts, and then look at the voting-age 
population (including non-citizens) and and 
CVAP to ensure they are not “diluting” 
Latino political power.  As Professor 
Nathaniel Persily of Stanford pointed out in 
2010, current census data on citizenship is 
less reliable than the census’ raw population 
counts. 
 
A constitutional rule requiring that districts 
must be drawn on CVAP alone thus would 
likely lead to fewer districts in which a 
majority of voters are Latino. 
 
The voters’ argument is mostly based on 
phrases taken from the Court’s earlier 
decisions. The text and history of the 
Constitution itself don’t offer much support 
for the idea that voters, not population, 
should be counted as the basis of 
representation. 
 
In Article I Section 2, the framers provided 
that seats the U.S. House of Representatives 
would be awarded to states “according to 
their respective numbers.” The “numbers” 
included immigrants, women, children, and 
other people ineligible to vote—lumped 
together as “free persons.” There were two 
exceptions to the rule: “Indians not taxed” 
(meaning those living under independent 
tribal governments) were not counted; and 
“other persons” (meaning slaves) were 
counted as three-fifths of “free persons.” 
 
After Emancipation, there were no more 
“other persons.” Section Two of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, approved in 1868, 
now provides that apportionment is to be 
based on ”the whole number of persons in 
each State, excluding Indians not taxed.” 
Population, not voting rights, again. (In 1924, 
Congress granted citizenship to Native 
people under tribal government; there are no 
more “Indians not taxed.”) 
 
Voting rights do appear in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, however. Immediately after the 
Civil War, Southern states were happy to 
have representation apportioned on the basis 
of the whole population of freed slaves, and 
not just at three-fifths of that sum, because it 
would have increased their number of House 
seats and electoral votes. They also planned 
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to keep the franchise all white, thereby 
inflating the power of white, southern voters. 
The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
tried to forestall that, without using racial 
terms, by providing that when the right to 
vote “is denied to any of the male inhabitants 
of such State, being twenty–one years of age, 
and citizens of the United States, or in any 
way abridged, except for participation in 
rebellion, or other crime,” the states would 
lose representation for the entire excluded 
group.  (That language has never really been 
tested; by 1870, the Fifteenth Amendment 
formally barred racial discrimination in 
voting altogether.) 
 
Taken together, these provisions suggest that 
the basic constitutional rule of apportionment 
is, as the Reynolds v. Sims Court said, raw 
population. The three-fifths clause in 1787 
and the “male inhabitants” clause in 1868 are 
phrased as extraordinary departures from that 
rule. 
 
These provisions, of course, do not directly 
govern the issue in Evenwel. They apply to 
federal apportionment; the districts in this 
case are state legislative ones.  The relevant 
constitutional provision, then is, the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment: “No state shall ... deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.” The privileges and 
immunities clause appears in the same 
section; it applies to “citizens of the United 
States”; equal protection, however, explicitly 
applies to every “person”—white and non-
white, immigrant and native-born, citizen and 
non-citizen. 
 
What right are we talking about? Is it the 
individual person’s right to representation? In 
a democratic system, leaders are elected by 
voters, but once elected, they represent all the 
people. Those too young to vote, those 
excluded because of criminal records, and 
those who are not citizens are “persons” for 
equal-protection purposes. Is it the individual 
voter’s right to an equal vote? Then voting-
age population or something like it would be 
the correct basis for apportionment. 
 
It’s not an easy question; but I think the 
theory, the text, and the history favor raw 
population.    
 
The real issue, though, is VRA Section Two. 
It impels some states with large Latino 
populations to draw districts that empower 
Latino voters—so that Latinos will have the 
“opportunity” to elect candidates of their 
choice. That requirement was added after 
congressional hearings in 1982, to provide a 
remedy to minority voters against voting 
procedures and districting that had the effect 
of reducing their influence, whether or not 
they can prove that the states intended to do 
so.  As a young lawyer in the Reagan 
administration, Chief Justice John Roberts 
expressed his dismay at this “effects test.” In 
a 2006 case about “vote dilution,” Roberts 
wrote a separate opinion that said, “It is a 
sordid business, this divvying us up by race.” 
This case might offer a chance to reduce 
Section Two’s impact. 
 
There’s going to be a lot of high-minded 
rhetoric about Evenwel. The real currency is 
bare-knuckle politics. That’s not surprising. 
Take John Adams’s fine words about 
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equality of representation, for example: He 
was his native Massachusetts, a populous 
state, had only one vote in the Continental 
Congress, the same as tiny Delaware. To 
people in Delaware, “equality” probably 
meant something quite different.  And ever 
since Adams’s time, debates about 
representation have usually been inspired by 
partisan advantage, not first principles of 
liberty. 
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“Federal Court Rejects Latest Attempt to Create Different Classes 
of Constituents through Exclusionary Redistricting” 
MALDEF 
November 10, 2014 
Last week, the U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Texas dismissed Evenwel 
v. Perry, a lawsuit which attempted to force 
the Texas Legislature to redraw its Senate 
District boundaries based on the voting 
electorate rather than total population 
numbers. MALDEF sought to intervene in 
the case on behalf of the Texas Senate 
Hispanic Caucus, five registered voters, and 
a U.S. citizen minor, but the court dismissed 
the case before ruling on the motion to 
intervene. 
 
"These repeated, pernicious attempts to 
discount some persons, including large 
numbers of future voting citizens, in drawing 
legislative districts seek to take our country 
back to the 19th century when a devil's 
bargain placed a provision in our original 
Constitution that counted some residents as 
only three-fifths of a person," stated Thomas 
A. Saenz, MALDEF President and General 
Counsel. "We must work to ensure that these 
purveyors of apartheid continue to face 
defeat in the courtroom." 
 
Evenwell v. Perry was the second attempt to 
force exclusionary redistricting in Texas. 
MALDEF also intervened in the first case, 
Lepak v. City of Irving, in which several 
residents of Irving, Texas, sued the City of 
Irving to allocate council districts based on 
citizen voting age population. In both cases, 
the courts held that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause 
allows voting districts to be based on total 
population, versus citizen voting age 
population. 
 
The continuous redistricting challenges that 
seek to overturn well-established 
redistricting laws further affirm the need to 
revive Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. 
Last July, the Supreme Court ruled 
unconstitutional a portion of the law used to 
identify states and localities that must follow 
special procedures before implementing 
changes in their voting systems. These 
frivolous lawsuits showcase the extent to 
which certain parties will go to suppress fair 
representation. MALDEF will continue to 
fight for equal representation and to protect 
the right to vote. 
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Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission 
14-232 
Ruling Below: Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 993 F. Supp. 2d 1042 (D. Ariz. 
2014) 
The U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona held that the legislative redistricting plan for 
the State of Arizona, based on the 2010 census, that was created by a state restricting 
commission, did not violate the one-person, one-vote principle of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment because the population deviations in the 10 districts submitted to the 
U.S. Department of Justice as minority ability-to-elect districts were predominantly a result of 
the commission's good faith efforts to achieve preclearance under the Voting Rights Act, 42 
U.S.C.S. § 1973c, which was a legitimate consideration; while partisanship might have played 
some role with respect to one particular voting district, the primary motivation to achieve 
preclearance was legitimate (credit Lexis Nexis). 
Question(s) Presented: (1) Whether the desire to gain partisan advantage for one political party 
justifies intentionally creating over-populated legislative districts that results in tens of thousands 
of individual voters being denied Equal Protection because their individual votes are devalued, 
violating the one-person, one-vote principle; and (2) whether the desire to obtain favorable 
preclearance review by the Justice Department permits the creation of legislative districts that 
deviate from the one-person, one-vote principle, and, even if creating unequal districts to obtain 
preclearance approval was once justified, whether this is still a legitimate justification after 
Shelby County v. Holder. 
 
Wesley W. HARRIS, et al., 
Plaintiffs 
v. 
ARIZONA INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMMISSION, et al., 
Defendants 
The United States District Court for the District of Arizona 
Filed on April 29, 2014 
[Excerpt; some citations and footnotes omitted] 
PER CURIAM: 
Plaintiffs, individual voters registered in the 
State of Arizona, challenge the map drawn 
for state legislative districts by the Arizona 
Independent Redistricting Commission for 
use starting in 2012, based on the 2010 
census. They argue that the Commission 
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underpopulated Democrat-leaning districts 
and overpopulated Republican-leaning 
districts for partisan reasons, in violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s one-person, 
one-vote principle. The Commission denies 
that it was driven by partisanship, explaining 
that the population deviations were driven by 
its efforts to comply with Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act. We conclude that the 
population deviations were primarily a result 
of good-faith efforts to comply with the 
Voting Rights Act, and that even though 
partisanship played some role in the design of 
the map, the Fourteenth Amendment 
challenge fails. 
The one-person, one-vote requirement of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not require that legislative 
districts have precisely equal population, but 
provides that divergences must be “based on 
legitimate considerations incident to the 
effectuation of a rational state policy.” The 
majority of the overpopulated districts in the 
map drawn by the Commission were 
Republican-leaning, while the majority of the 
underpopulated districts leaned Democratic. 
Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that this 
correlation was no accident, that partisanship 
drove it, and that partisanship is not a 
permissible reason to deviate from 
population equality in redistricting. 
The Commission does not argue that the 
population deviations came about by 
accident, but it disputes that the motivation 
was partisanship. Most of the 
underpopulateddistricts have significant 
minority populations, and the Commission 
presented them to the Department of Justice 
as districts in which minority groups would 
have the opportunity to elect candidates of 
their choice. Section 5 of the Voting Rights 
Act required that the Commission obtain 
preclearance from the Department before its 
plan went into effect. To obtain preclearance, 
the Commission had to show that any 
proposed changes would not diminish the 
ability of minority groups to elect the 
candidates of their choice. The Commission 
argues that its effort to comply with the 
Voting Rights Act drove the population 
deviations. 
For the purpose of this opinion, we assume 
without deciding that partisanship is not a 
legitimate reason to deviate from population 
equality. We find that the primary factor 
driving the population deviation was the 
Commission’s good-faith effort to comply 
with the Voting Rights Act and, in particular, 
to obtain preclearance from the Department 
of Justice on the first try. The commissioners 
were aware of the political consequences of 
redistricting, however, and we find that some 
of the commissioners were motivated in part 
in some of the linedrawing decisions by a 
desire to improve Democratic prospects in 
the affected districts. Nonetheless, the 
Fourteenth Amendment gives states some 
degree of leeway in drawing their own 
legislative districts and, because compliance 
with federal voting rights law was the 
predominant reason for the deviations, we 
conclude that no federal constitutional 
violation occurred. 
We do not decide whether any violations of 
state law occurred. Though plaintiffs have 
alleged violations of state law and the 
Arizona Constitution, we decided early in the 
proceedings and announced in a prior order 
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that Arizona’s courts are the proper forum for 
such claims. We discuss that subject further 
below, at 32–33. We express no opinion on 
whether the redistricting plan violated the 
equal population clause of the Arizona 
Constitution, whether the Commission 
violated state law in adopting the grid map 
with population variations rather than strict 
population equality, or whether state law 
prohibits adjusting legislative districts for 
partisan reasons. All that we consider is 
whether a federal constitutional violation 
occurred. 
At trial, plaintiffs focused on three districts 
that they argued were not true Voting Rights 
Districts and therefore could not justify 
population deviations: Districts 8, 24, and 26. 
Accordingly, this opinion largely focuses on 
the population shifts associated with the 
creation of these three districts. 
I. Course of Proceedings 
Plaintiffs filed this action on April 27, 2012, 
and subsequently filed a First Amended 
Complaint. This three-judge district court 
was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
2284(a). Plaintiffs sought a declaration that 
the final legislative map violated both the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the 
equal population requirement of the Arizona 
Constitution, an injunction against enforcing 
the map, and a mandate that the Commission 
draw a new map for legislative elections 
following the 2012 elections. Originally, not 
only was the Commission a defendant in this 
action, but so too were each of the five 
commissioners in their official capacities. 
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint 
for failure to state a claim. In a reasoned 
order, we denied the motion. Plaintiffs then 
filed a Second Amended Complaint. 
Prior to trial, the parties filed several motions 
that the court summarily disposed of on 
February 22, 2013. First, defendants moved 
to stay the case pending the resolution of 
state-law claims in state court, which we 
denied. Defendants also moved for a 
protective order on the basis of legislative 
privilege, which we denied. Finally, 
defendants moved for judgment on the 
pleadings, asking for dismissal of the 
individual commissioners as defendants and 
for dismissal of plaintiffs’ claim for relief 
under the equal population requirement of the 
Arizona Constitution. We granted this 
motion, dismissing the individual 
commissioners from the suit and dismissing 
plaintiffs’ second claim for relief. We explain 
the bases for our rulings on these motions 
later in this opinion, at 28–40. 
Starting March 25, 2013, we presided over a 
five-day bench trial. Among other witnesses, 
all five commissioners testified. 
II. Findings of Fact 
Most of the factual findings below, based in 
large part on transcripts of public hearings 
and other documents in the public record, 
were not disputed at trial. Rather, what was 
most controverted was what inferences about 
the Commission’s motivation we should 
draw from the largely undisputed facts. We 
discuss that issue, whether and to what extent 
partisanship motivated the Commission, at 
the end of this section, at 23–28. 
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To the extent any finding of fact should more 
properly be designated a conclusion of law, it 
should be treated as a conclusion of law. 
Similarly, to the extent any conclusion of law 
should more properly be designated a finding 
of fact, it should be treated as a finding of 
fact. 
A. The Approved Legislative Redistricting 
Plan 
The first election cycle using the legislative 
map drawn by the Commission took place in 
2012. Arizona has thirty legislative districts, 
each of which elects two representatives and 
one senator. The following chart summarizes 
pertinent electoral results and population 
statistics for the Commission’s 2012 
legislative map, which we explain in greater 
detail below. 
In the 2012 elections, Republicans won a 
total of 36 out of the 60 house seats, winning 
both seats in 17 districts and 1 seat in 2 
districts. Democrats won the remaining 24 
house seats, winning 2 seats in 11 districts 
and 1 seat in 2 districts. Republicans won 17 
out of 30 senate seats, and Democrats won 
the remaining 13. The Democratic senate 
candidate narrowly won in District 8, but the 
Republican candidate might have won if not 
for the presence of a Libertarian candidate in 
the race.3 In all, 16 districts elected only 
Republicans to the state legislative houses, 11 
districts elected only Democrats, and 3 
districts elected a combination of 
Republicans and Democrats. 
Ideal population is the average per-district 
population, or the population each district 
would have if population was evenly 
distributed across all districts. Of the 16 
districts that elected only Republicans to the 
state legislature, 15 were above the ideal 
population and 1 was below. Of the 11 
districts that elected only Democrats to the 
state legislature, 2 were above the ideal 
population and 11 were below. District 8 was 
below ideal population, and the other 2 
districts that elected legislators from both 
parties were above ideal population. 
Of the 10 districts the Commission presented 
to the Department of Justice as districts in 
which minority candidates could elect 
candidates of their choice, or “ability-to-elect 
districts,” all 10 only elected Democrats to 
the state legislature in 2012. Nine out of ten 
of these ability-to-elect districts were below 
the ideal population, and one was above. 
Of the 9 districts presented to the Department 
of Justice as districts in which Hispanics 
could elect a candidate of their choice, all but 
District 24 elected at least one Hispanic 
candidate to the state legislature in the 2012 
elections. In District 26, only one of the three 
legislators elected in 2012 was of Hispanic 
descent. Of the 27 state legislators elected in 
the purported ability-to-elect districts, 16 
were of Hispanic descent. 
District 7 was presented to the Department of 
Justice as a district in which Native 
Americans could elect candidates of their 
choice, and it elected Native American 
candidates in all three of its state legislative 
races. 
Maximum population deviation refers to the 
difference, in terms of percentage deviation 
from the ideal population, between the most 
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populated district and the least populated 
district in the map. In the approved legislative 
map, maximum population deviation was 8.8 
percent; District 12 had the largest 
population, at 4.1 percent over the ideal 
population, and District 7 had the smallest 
population, at 4.7 percent under the ideal. 
B. Formation of the Commission 
In 2000, Arizona voters amended the state 
constitution by passing Proposition 106, an 
initiative removing responsibility for 
congressional and legislative redistricting 
from the state legislature and placing it in the 
newly established Independent Redistricting 
Commission. Five citizens serve on the 
Commission, consisting of two Republicans, 
two Democrats, and one unaffiliated with 
either major party. Selection of the 
commissioners begins with the Arizona 
Commission on Appellate Court 
Appointments, which interviews applicants 
and creates a slate of ten Republican 
candidates, ten Democratic candidates, and 
five independent or unaffiliated candidates. 
Four commissioners are appointed from the 
party slates, one by each of the party leaders 
from the two chambers of the legislature. 
Once appointed, those four commissioners 
select the fifth commissioner from the slate 
of unaffiliated candidates, and the fifth 
commissioner also serves as the commission 
chair. 
Pursuant to these requirements, Republican 
commissioners Scott Freeman and Richard 
Stertz were appointed by the Speaker of the 
House and the President of the Senate, 
respectively, and Democratic commissioners 
Jose Herrera and Linda McNulty were 
appointed by the House Minority Leader and 
Senate Minority Leader, respectively. 
Commissioners Freeman, Stertz, Herrera, 
and McNulty then interviewed all five 
candidates on the unaffiliated slate. 
In his interview notes, Commissioner Stertz 
noted his concerns with the liberal leanings 
of most of the candidates on the unaffiliated 
list. For example, he wrote that Kimber 
Lanning’s fundraising efforts were almost all 
for Democrats, and that her Facebook page 
indicated a fondness for Van Jones. Paul 
Bender, another candidate, served on the 
board of the ACLU. Margaret Silva identified 
Cesar Chavez as her hero, and her Facebook 
profile picture featured her alongside Nancy 
Pelosi, the Democratic leader in the U.S. 
House of Representatives. Ray Bladine was 
his first choice for the position, whom Stertz 
described as balanced despite Bladine’s 
former tenure as chief of staff for a 
Democratic mayor. In a public meeting, the 
four commissioners unanimously selected 
Colleen Mathis as the fifth commissioner and 
chairwoman. In his interview notes 
Commissioner Stertz described her as 
balanced, though noting that she and her 
husband had supported Democratic 
candidates. Mathis and her husband had also 
made contributions to Republican candidates. 
C. Selection of Counsel and Mapping 
Consultant 
The Commission has authority to hire legal 
counsel to “represent the people of Arizona 
in the legal defense of a redistricting plan,” as 
well as staff and consultants to assist with the 
mapping process. The selection of the 
Commission’s counsel and mapping 
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consultant sparked public controversy, and 
plaintiffs argue that the process reflected a 
partisan bias on the part of Chairwoman 
Mathis. 
The previous Commission, after the 2000 
census, had retained a Democratic attorney 
and a Republican attorney. Chairwoman 
Mathis expressed interest in hiring one 
attorney instead of two, as the counsel hired 
would represent the entire Commission. The 
other four commissioners preferred to hire 
two attorneys with different party affiliations, 
however. That is what the Commission 
decided to do. 
The Commission used the State Procurement 
Office to help retain counsel and interviewed 
attorneys from six law firms. Among the 
interviewees were the two attorneys who had 
worked for the previous Commission: Lisa 
Hauser, an attorney with the firm of 
Gammage & Burnham and a Republican, and 
Michael Mandell, an attorney with the 
Mandell Law Firm and a Democrat. Other 
attorneys interviewed by the Commission 
included Mary O’Grady, a Democrat with 
Osborn Maledon, and Joe Kanefield, a 
Republican with Ballard Spahr. Osborn 
Maledon and Ballard Spahr received the 
highest scores from the Commission based 
on forms provided by the State Procurement 
Office for use in the selection process. 
Nonetheless, Commissioner Herrera 
expressed a preference for retaining Mandell 
as Democratic counsel, and Commissioners 
Stertz and Freeman preferred Hauser and 
Gammage & Burnham as Republican 
counsel. 
In a public meeting, Commissioner Herrera 
moved to retain Osborn Maledon and Ballard 
Spahr at Chairwoman Mathis’s suggestion. 
Commissioner Herrera later explained that 
while Mandell was his first choice, Osborn 
Maledon and Ballard Spahr received the 
highest evaluation scores. Commissioner 
Freeman expressed his preference for 
Gammage & Burnham, and said he would 
give deference to the Democratic 
commissioners’ preference for Democratic 
counsel if they would do the same for the 
Republican commissioners. Commissioner 
Stertz then made a motion to amend, to 
instead retain the Mandell Law Firm and 
Gammage & Burnham. The amendment was 
defeated on a 2-3 vote, with Commissioners 
Stertz and Freeman voting for it and 
Commissioners Mathis, Herrera, and 
McNulty voting against. The motion to retain 
Osborn Maledon and Ballard Spahr carried 
with a 3-2 vote, with Commissioners Mathis, 
Herrera, and McNulty voting for the motion 
and Commissioners Stertz and Freeman 
voting against. The Commission thus 
selected a Republican attorney for whom 
neither of the Republican commissioners 
voted. 
In selecting a mapping consultant, the 
Commission initially worked with the State 
Procurement Office. An applicant for the 
position had to submit, among other things, 
an explanation of its capabilities to perform 
the work, any previous redistricting 
experience, any partisan connections, and a 
cost sheet. In the initial round of scoring, each 
applicant was scored on a 1000-point scale. 
Each commissioner independently filled out 
a scoring sheet, which considered capability 
to do the work but not cost, rating each 
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applicant on a 700-point scale. The State 
Procurement Office rated each applicant on a 
300-point scale, 200 points of which 
evaluated the relative cost of the bid. 
The Commission considered the first round 
of scoring, and then announced a short list of 
four firms that it would interview for the 
mapping consultant position. Those firms 
were Strategic Telemetry, National 
Demographics, Research Advisory Services, 
and Terra Systems Southwest. National 
Demographics, which had served as mapping 
consultant for the previous Commission, had 
received the highest score in the first round of 
evaluations. 
The Commission interviewed the four 
selected firms in a public meeting. During the 
interview of the head of National 
Demographics, Commissioner Herrera 
expressed concern that there was a perception 
that the firm was affiliated with Republican 
interests. National Demographics had 
worked for both Democratic and Republican 
clients, though more Republicans than 
Democrats. In interviewing Strategic 
Telemetry, Commissioners Freeman and 
Stertz asked whether, because Strategic 
Telemetry had worked for a number of 
Democratic clients but no Republican clients, 
the firm would be perceived as biased. 
After these interviews, the commissioners 
conducted a second round of scoring before 
selecting a firm. In this round of scoring, 
Commissioners Mathis, Herrera, and 
McNulty all gave Strategic Telemetry a 
perfect score. Strategic Telemetry came out 
of this round with the highest overall score. 
Prior to the public meeting in which the 
Commission voted to retain a mapping 
consultant, Chairwoman Mathis made a 
phone call to Commissioner Stertz and asked 
him to support the choice of Strategic 
Telemetry. 
The Commission selected Strategic 
Telemetry as the mapping consultant on a 3-
2 vote, with Commissioners McNulty, 
Herrera, and Mathis voting in favor, and 
Commissioners Freeman and Stertz voting 
against. Before the vote, Commissioners 
Freeman and Stertz had expressed a 
preference for National Demographics. 
At subsequent meetings, the Commission 
heard extensive criticism from members of 
the public about the selection of Strategic 
Telemetry. Much of the criticism related to 
the Democratic affiliations of the firm and to 
the fact that it was based out of Washington, 
D.C., rather than Arizona. Strategic 
Telemetry was founded primarily as a 
microtargeting firm, which uses statistical 
analyses of voter opinions to assist political 
campaigns. Ken Strasma, president and 
founder of Strategic Telemetry, considered 
himself a Democrat, as did most of the other 
employees of the firm. The firm had worked 
for Democratic, independent, and 
nonpartisan campaigns, but no Republican 
campaigns. While Strasma had redistricting 
experience in more than thirty states before 
he founded the firm in 2003, the firm itself 
had no statewide redistricting experience at 
the time of its bid, nor any redistricting 
experience in Arizona. Also making Strategic 
Telemetry a controversial choice was that it 
had submitted the most expensive bid to the 
Commission. All of this was known to the 
Commission when Strategic Telemetry was 
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selected as the mapping consultant for the 
Commission and when Commissioners 
Mathis, Herrera, and McNulty each gave 
Strategic Telemetry a perfect score of 700 
points during the second round of scoring. 
D. The Grid Map 
The Commission was required to begin the 
mapping process by creating “districts of 
equal population in a grid-like pattern across 
the state.” The Commission directed its 
mapping consultant to prepare two 
alternative grid maps. Believing that the 
Arizona Constitution intended the 
Commission to begin with a clean slate, 
several commissioners expressed interest in 
having an element of randomness in the 
generation of the grid map. The Commission 
decided, after a series of coin flips, that the 
consultant would generate two alternative 
grid maps, one beginning in the center of the 
state and moving out counterclockwise, and 
the other with districts starting in the 
southeast corner of the state, moving inwards 
clockwise. 
After the two maps were presented, the 
Commission voted to adopt the second 
alternative. The grid map selected had a 
maximum population deviation—the 
difference between the most populated and 
least populated district—of 4.07 percent of 
the average district population. 
E. Voting Rights Act Preclearance 
Requirement 
During the redistricting cycle at issue, 
Arizona was subject to the requirements of 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Before a 
state covered by Section 5 can implement a 
redistricting plan, the state must prove that its 
proposed plan “neither has the purpose nor 
will have the effect of denying or abridging 
the right to vote on account of race or color.” 
The state must either institute an action with 
the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia for a declaratory judgment that the 
plan has no such purpose or effect, or, as the 
Commission did here, submit the plan to the 
U.S. Department of Justice. If the Justice 
Department does not object within sixty days, 
the plan has been precleared and the state 
may implement it.  
A plan has an impermissible effect under 
Section 5 if it “would lead to a retrogression 
in the position of racial minorities with 
respect to their effective exercise of the 
electoral franchise.” A redistricting plan 
leads to retrogression when, compared to the 
plan currently in effect, the new plan 
diminishes the ability of minority groups to 
“elect their preferred candidates of choice.” 
There is no retrogression so long as the 
number of ability-to-elect districts does not 
decrease from the benchmark to the proposed 
plan. 
A district gives a minority group the 
opportunity to elect the candidate of its 
choice not only when the minority group 
makes up a majority of the district’s 
population (a majority-minority district), but 
also when it can elect its preferred candidate 
with the help of another minority group (a 
coalition district) or white voters (crossover 
districts). A minority group’s preferred 
candidate need not be a member of the racial 
minority. “Ability to elect” properly refers to 
the ability to elect the preferred candidate of 
Hispanic voters from the given district, which 
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is not necessarily the same thing as the ability 
to elect a Hispanic candidate from that 
district, though there is obvious overlap 
between those two concepts. 
In determining the ability to elect in districts 
in the proposed and benchmark plan, the 
Department of Justice begins its review of a 
plan submitted for preclearance by analyzing 
the districts with current census data. The 
analysis is a complex one relying on more 
than just census numbers, however, and does 
not turn on reaching a fixed percentage of 
minority population. Rather, the Department 
looks at additional demographic data such as 
group voting patterns, electoral participation, 
election history, and voter turnout.  
Several aspects of the preclearance process 
encourage states to do more than the bare 
minimum to avoid retrogression. First, state 
officials do not know exactly what is required 
to achieve preclearance. As explained above, 
the Department of Justice relies on a variety 
of data in assessing retrogression, rather than 
assessing a fixed goal that states can easily 
ascertain. Bruce Cain, an expert in Voting 
Rights Act compliance in redistricting who 
served as a consultant to the Commission 
following the 2000 census and was retained 
for this lawsuit by the current Commission, 
testified at trial that the lack of clear rules 
creates “regulatory uncertainty” that forces 
states “to be cautious and to take extra steps.” 
Moreover, the preclearance process with 
respect to any particular plan is generally an 
opaque one. When the Department of Justice 
objects to a plan, the state receives an 
explanation of the basis for the objection. 
When the Department does not object, by 
contrast, the state receives no such 
information. In other words, the state does 
not know how many benchmark districts the 
Department believed there were nor how 
many ability-to-elect districts the Department 
concluded were in the proposed plan. Nor 
does it know whether the new plan barely 
precleared or could have done with fewer 
ability-to-elect districts. 
Consultants and attorneys hired by a state to 
assist with the preclearance process may also 
tend to encourage taking additional steps to 
achieve preclearance. The professional 
reputation of a consultant gives him a strong 
incentive to ensure that the jurisdictions he 
advises obtain preclearance. The 
Commission, for example, asked applicants 
to serve as its mapping consultant whether 
they had previously worked with states in 
redistricting and whether those jurisdictions 
had succeeded in gaining preclearance on the 
first try. 
These factors may work together to tilt the 
board somewhat because they encourage a 
state that wants to obtain preclearance to 
overshoot the mark, particularly if it wants its 
first submission to be approved. Because it is 
not clear where the Justice Department will 
draw the line, there is a natural incentive to 
provide a margin of error or to aim higher 
than might actually be necessary. Attorneys 
and consultants, aware that their professional 
reputations may be affected, can be 
motivated to push in that direction. 
The Arizona Commission early in the process 
identified obtaining preclearance on its first 
attempt as a priority. All of the 
commissioners, Democrats and Republicans 
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alike, shared this goal. In prior decades, 
Arizona had never obtained preclearance 
from the Department of Justice for its 
legislative redistricting plan based upon its 
first submission. The Commission was aware 
that, among other consequences, failure to 
preclear would make Arizona ineligible to 
bail out as a Section 5 jurisdiction for another 
ten years. Although the Commission 
considered and often adjusted lines to meet 
other goals, it put a priority on compliance 
with the Voting Rights Act and, in particular, 
on obtaining preclearance on the first 
attempt. 
F. The Draft Map 
After adopting a grid map, the Commission 
was directed by the Arizona Constitution to 
adjust the map to comply with the United 
States Constitution and the federal Voting 
Rights Act. It was also instructed to adjust the 
map, “to the extent practicable,” to comply 
with five other enumerated criteria: (1) 
equality of population between districts; (2) 
geographic compactness and contiguity; (3) 
respect for communities of interest; (4) 
respect for visible geographic features, city, 
town and county boundaries, and undivided 
census tracts; and (5) competitiveness, if it 
would “create no significant detriment to the 
other goals.” The map approved by the 
Commission after the first round of these 
adjustments was only a draft map, which was 
required to undergo public comment and a 
further round of revisions before final 
approval. 
Before beginning to adjust the grid map, the 
Commission received presentations on the 
Voting Rights Act from its attorneys, its 
mapping consultant, and its Voting Rights 
Act consultant Bruce Adelson. Adelson 
previously worked for the Department of 
Justice, where he led the team that had 
reviewed and objected to the first legislative 
map submitted by Arizona for preclearance 
in 2002. Adelson gave the Commission an 
overview of the preclearance process. He 
explained that determining whether a 
minority population had the ability to elect 
was a complex analysis that turned on more 
than just the percentage of minorities in a 
district. He explained, for example, that in 
reviewing Arizona’s submission from the 
prior decade, the Department had found a 
district where it concluded that minorities 
had an ability to elect even though they made 
up only between 30 and 40 percent of the 
population. Adelson informed the 
Commission at that time that he believed the 
2002 map that was ultimately approved had 
nine districts in which minorities had an 
ability to elect their preferred candidates. 
Because the preclearance process focused on 
making sure there was no retrogression, that 
number was the benchmark, meaning that the 
new plan had to achieve at least the same 
number of ability-to-elect districts. 
One of the most important factors the 
Department of Justice considers in 
determining the ability to elect in a district is 
its level of racial polarization, which is a 
measure of the voting tendencies of whites 
and minorities in elections pitting a white 
candidate against a minority candidate. A 
racial polarization study is a statistical 
analysis of past election results to determine 
the level of racial polarization in a district. 
When it first started considering potential 
benchmark districts, the Commission did not 
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have any formal racial polarization analysis 
at its disposal and relied primarily on 
demographic data from the 2010 census. The 
Commission eventually retained Professor 
Gary King, a social scientist at Harvard 
University recommended by the 
Commission’s counsel, to conduct a racial 
polarization analysis. 
Until the Commission had a formal racial 
polarization analysis, it often used what it 
called the “Cruz Index” to assess whether 
voters in an area might support a Hispanic 
candidate. Devised by Commissioners 
McNulty and Stertz, the Cruz Index used data 
from the 2010 election for Mine Inspector, a 
statewide race pitting Joe Hart, a Republican, 
non-Hispanic white (or Anglo) candidate, 
against Manuel Cruz, a Democrat, Hispanic 
candidate. The Cruz Index, sometimes 
described by commissioners and staff as a 
“down and dirty” measure, was not intended 
to be the Commission’s only analysis of 
cohesion in minority voting in proposed 
districts, but rather a rough proxy until the 
Commission had formal racial polarization 
analysis. In the end, however, the voting 
pattern estimates derived from the Cruz 
Index wound up corresponding closely to the 
voting pattern estimates King derived from 
his formal statistical analysis. 
To explore possible adjustments to the grid 
map, the commissioners could either direct 
the mapping consultant to create a map with 
a certain change or use mapping software to 
make changes themselves. They referred to 
these maps as “what if” maps because the 
maps simply showed possible line changes 
that the Commission might choose to 
incorporate into the draft map. Willie 
Desmond was the Strategic Telemetry 
employee with primary responsibility for 
assisting commissioners with the mapping 
software or creating “what if” maps at their 
direction. 
The Commission originally operated on the 
assumption that it had to create nine ability-
to-elect districts, based on Adelson’s report 
that there were nine benchmark districts. As 
a result, the earliest “what if” maps focused 
on creating nine minority ability-to-elect 
districts. Commissioner Freeman, for 
example, directed Desmond to create several 
maps that would create nine ability-to-elect 
districts. 
Soon, however, the Commission began 
considering the possibility that there might be 
ten benchmark districts. Counsel advised that 
there were some districts without a majority-
minority population that had a history of 
electing minority candidates, such as District 
23 from the 2002 legislative map. Counsel 
further explained that, even though there 
were seven majority-minority benchmark 
districts and two to three other districts where 
minorities did not make up the majority, they 
nonetheless might be viewed as having the 
ability to elect. Because it was uncertain how 
many benchmark and ability-to-elect districts 
the Department of Justice would determine 
existed, counsel advised that creating ten 
districts would increase the odds of getting 
precleared on the first attempt. 
The Commission worked to make Districts 
24 and 26 ones in which, despite lacking a 
majority of the population, Hispanics could 
elect candidates of their choice. At this point, 
the Commission was still relying on the Cruz 
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Index to predict minority voting patterns in 
proposed districts. As the Commission 
explored shifting boundaries to create ability-
to-elect districts, their mapping consultant 
apprised the Commission of the effects of the 
shifts on various statistics, such as minority 
voting population, the Cruz Index, and the 
deviation from average district population. 
Counsel advised the Commission that some 
population disparity was permissible if it was 
a result of compliance with the Voting Rights 
Act. 
On October 10, 2011, the Commission 
approved a draft legislative map on a 4-1 
vote, with all but Commissioner Stertz voting 
in favor of the map. That map had ten districts 
identified by the Commission as minority 
ability-to-elect districts. 
G. The Effort to Remove Chairwoman Mathis  
The Arizona Constitution prescribes at least 
a thirty-day comment period after the 
adoption of the draft map. The Commission 
did not begin working on the final map until 
late November, however, because of a delay 
resulting from an effort to remove 
Chairwoman Mathis from the Commission. 
On October 26, Governor Janice Brewer sent 
a letter to the Commission alleging it had 
committed “substantial neglect of duty and 
gross misconduct in office” for, among other 
things, the manner in which it selected the 
mapping consultant. On November 1, the 
Governor’s office informed Chairwoman 
Mathis that it would remove her from the 
Commission for committing gross 
misconduct in office, conditioned upon the 
concurrence of two-thirds of the Arizona 
Senate. The Arizona Constitution permits the 
governor to remove a member of the 
Commission, with concurrence of two-thirds 
of the Senate, for “substantial neglect of 
duty” or “gross misconduct in office.” After 
the Senate concurred in the removal of 
Chairwoman Mathis in a special session, the 
Commission petitioned the Arizona Supreme 
Court for the reinstatement of Chairwoman 
Mathis on the basis that the Governor had 
exceeded her authority under the Arizona 
Constitution. On November 17, that court 
ordered the reinstatement of Chairwoman 
Mathis, concluding that the Governor did not 
have legal cause to remove her.  
H. The Final Map 
On November 29, the Commission began 
working to modify the draft map to create the 
final map it would submit to the Department 
of Justice. Because of the delay caused by the 
effort to remove Chairwoman Mathis, the 
Commission felt under pressure to finalize its 
work in time to permit election officials and 
prospective candidates to prepare for the 
2012 elections, knowing that the 
preclearance process would also take time. 
The Commission received a draft racial 
polarization voting analysis prepared by King 
and Strasma. According to the draft analysis, 
minorities would be able to elect candidates 
of their choice in all ten proposed ability-to-
elect districts in the draft map. 
The Commission received advice from its 
attorneys and consultants as to the 
importance of presenting the Department of 
Justice with at least ten ability-to-elect 
districts. Adelson said that, based on the 
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information he had received since his earlier 
assessment, he believed the Department 
would conclude that there were ten 
benchmark districts. He also emphasized 
that, due to the uncertainty in determining 
what constitutes a benchmark district, the 
Department might determine there were more 
benchmark districts than what the 
Commission had concluded. Counsel advised 
the Commission that it would be “prudent to 
stay the course in terms of the ten districts 
that are in the draft map and look to . . . 
strengthen them if there is a way to strengthen 
them.” 
The Commission also received advice that it 
could use population shifts, within certain 
limits, to strengthen these districts. Adelson 
advised the Commission that 
underpopulating minority districts was an 
acceptable tool for complying with the 
Voting Rights Act, so long as the maximum 
deviation remained within ten percent. 
According to Adelson, underpopulating 
districts to increase the proportion of 
minorities was an “accepted redistricting 
tool” and something that the Department of 
Justice looked at favorably when assessing 
compliance with Section 5. According to 
Strasma, underpopulation could strengthen 
the districts in several ways. First, it could 
increase the percentage of minority voters in 
a district. Second, it could account for 
expected growth in the Hispanic districts, 
which might otherwise become 
overpopulated in the decade following the 
implementation of a new map. 
The Commission directed Strasma and 
Adelson to look for ways to strengthen the 
ability-to-elect districts and report back. At a 
subsequent meeting, Strasma, Adelson, and 
Desmond presented a number of options for 
improving the districts along with the trade-
offs associated with those changes. Strasma 
identified Districts 24 and 26 in particular as 
districts that might warrant further efforts to 
strengthen the minority ability to elect. Doing 
so would increase the likelihood that the 
Department of Justice would recognize those 
districts as ability-to-elect districts and thus 
the likelihood that the plan would obtain 
preclearance. 
The Commission adopted a number of 
changes to Districts 24 and 26, including 
many purportedly aimed at strengthening the 
minority population’s ability to elect. 
Between the draft map and final map, the 
Hispanic population in District 24 increased 
from 38.6 percent to 41.3 percent, and the 
Hispanic voting-age population increased 
from 31.8 percent to 34.1 percent. In District 
26, the Hispanic population increased from 
36.8 percent to 38.5 percent, and the Hispanic 
voting-age population increased from 30.4 
percent to 32 percent. 
A consequence of these changes was an 
increase in population inequality. District 
24’s population decreased from 0.2 percent 
above the ideal population to 3 percent 
below. District 26’s population increased 
from 0.1 percent above the ideal population 
to 0.3 percent above. 
Commissioner McNulty asked Desmond to 
explore possibilities for making either 
District 8 or 11 more competitive. Desmond 
presented an option to the Commission that 
would have made District 8 more 
competitive. The Republican commissioners 
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expressed opposition to the proposed change. 
Commissioner Stertz argued that the change 
favored Democrats in District 8 while 
“hyperpacking” Republicans into District 11. 
Commissioner Freeman argued that 
competitiveness should be applied “fairly and 
evenhandedly” across the state rather than 
just advantaging one party in a particular 
district. The Republican commissioners were 
correct that the change would necessarily 
favor Democratic electoral prospects given 
that the voter registration in the existing 
versions of both Districts 8 and 11 favored 
Republicans and that Commissioner 
McNulty did not propose any corresponding 
effort to make any Democratic-leaning 
districts more competitive. Commissioner 
McNulty was absent from the meetings in 
which these initial discussions occurred, but 
Commissioner Herrera noted that 
competitiveness was one of the criteria the 
Commission was required to consider and 
expressed support for the change. 
Commissioner McNulty asked Desmond to 
try a few other ways of shifting the lines 
between Districts 8 and 11, one of which 
would have kept several communities with 
high minority populations together in District 
8. Commissioner McNulty, noting that the 
area had a history of having an opportunity to 
elect, raised the possibility that the change 
might also preserve that opportunity. 
Adelson opined that, if the minority 
population of District 8 were increased 
slightly, the Commission might be able to 
present it to the Department of Justice as an 
eleventh opportunity-to-elect district, which 
would “unquestionably enhance the 
submission and enhance chances for 
preclearance.” Counsel suggested that having 
another possible ability-to-elect district could 
be helpful because District 26 was not as 
strong of an ability-to-elect district as the 
other districts. 
District 8 contained many of the same 
concentrations of minority populations as the 
district identified as District 23 in the 
previous decade’s plan. The comparable 
district in that region of the state had a history 
of electing minority candidates prior to the 
2002 redistricting cycle. In 2002, the 
Department of Justice identified that district 
as one of the reasons why the Commission 
did not obtain preclearance of its first 
proposed plan in that cycle. Although the 
Commission later argued to the Department 
of Justice in its 2012 submission that the 
minorities could not consistently elect their 
candidate of choice in that district between 
2002 and 2012, several minority candidates 
had been elected to the state legislature from 
the district in that time period. 
The Commission voted 3-2 to implement 
Commissioner McNulty’s proposed change 
into the working map and send it to Dr. King 
for further analysis, with the Republican 
commissioners voting against. This was the 
only change order that resulted in a divided 
vote. 
This change order also affected the 
population count of Districts 11, 12, and 16. 
The order changed the deviation from ideal 
population from 1.5 percent to -2.3 percent in 
District 8, from 1.9 percent to 0.3 percent in 
District 11, from 1.7 percent to 4.3 percent in 
District 12, and from 1.9 percent to 4.8 
percent in District 16. Because of subsequent 
changes, the population deviations in these 
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districts in the final map was -2.2 percent for 
District 8, 0.1 percent for District 11, 4.1 
percent for District 12, and 3.3 percent for 
District 16. Therefore, the change in 
population deviation for each district that is 
both attributable to Commissioner 
McNulty’s change order and that actually 
remained in the final map was an increase in 
deviation of 0.7 percent for District 8, a 
decrease in deviation of 1.6 percent for 
District 11, an increase of 2.4 percent for 
District 12, and an increase in deviation of 1.4 
percent for District 16. 
These changes increased the percentage of 
Hispanic population in District 8 from 25.9 
percent in the draft map to 34.8 percent in the 
final map, with Hispanic voting-age 
population from 22.8 percent to 31.3 percent. 
The Commission ultimately concluded, 
however, that while District 8 came closer to 
constituting a minority ability-to-elect 
district than the previous District 23, it did 
not ensure minority voters the ability to elect 
candidates of their choice. The changes were 
nonetheless retained in the final map. 
The Commission approved the final 
legislative map on January 17, 2012, on a 3-
2 vote, with the Republican commissioners 
voting against. 
On February 28, 2012, the Commission 
submitted its plan to the Department of 
Justice for preclearance purposes. In its 
written submission, the Commission argued 
that the benchmark plan contained seven 
ability-to-elect districts, comprised of one 
Native American district and six Hispanic 
districts. The Commission argued that the 
new map was an improvement over the 
benchmark plan, as the new map contained 
ten districts (one Native American district 
and nine Hispanic districts) in which a 
minority group had the opportunity to elect 
the candidate of its choice. The Commission 
also noted that while District 8 was not an 
ability-to-elect district, its performance by 
that measure was improved over its 
predecessor, Benchmark District 23. 
On April 26, the Department of Justice 
approved the Commission’s map. 
I. The Motivation for the Deviations 
As noted previously and explained in more 
detail below, at 41–44, we conclude as a 
matter of law that the burden of proof is on 
plaintiffs. To prevail, plaintiffs must prove 
that the population deviations were not 
motivated by legitimate considerations or, 
possibly, if motivated in part by legitimate 
considerations, that illegitimate 
considerations predominated over legitimate 
considerations. We assume that seeking 
partisan advantage is not a legitimate 
consideration, and we conclude, as discussed 
at 44–49, that compliance with the Voting 
Rights Act is a legitimate consideration. 
We find that plaintiffs have not satisfied their 
burden of proof. In particular, we find that the 
deviations in the ten districts submitted to the 
Department of Justice as minority ability-to-
elect districts were predominantly a result of 
the Commission’s good-faith efforts to 
achieve preclearance under the Voting Rights 
Act. Partisanship may have played some role, 
but the primary motivation was legitimate. 
With respect to the deviations resulting from 
Commissioner McNulty’s change to District 
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8 between the draft map and the final map, 
we find that partisanship clearly played some 
role. We also find, however, that legitimate 
motivations to achieve preclearance also 
played a role in the Commission’s decision to 
enact the change to District 8. 
We acknowledge that it is difficult to separate 
out different motivations in this context. That 
is particularly true in this instance because 
the cited motivations pulled in exactly the 
same direction. As a practical matter, 
changes that strengthened minority ability-
to-elect districts were also changes that 
improved the prospects for electing 
Democratic candidates. Those motivations 
were not at cross purposes. They were 
entirely parallel.  
The Cruz Index, used by the commissioners 
in considering changes to the map aimed at 
strengthening minority districts, illustrates 
the overlap of these two motivations. It 
applied results from an election contest 
between a Hispanic Democrat and a white, 
non-Hispanic (Anglo) Republican. The 
commissioners used votes for candidate Cruz 
to reflect a willingness to vote for a Hispanic 
candidate—which was itself a proxy for the 
ability of the Hispanic population to elect its 
preferred candidate, regardless of that 
candidate’s ethnicity—but the voters could 
have been motivated, as much or even more, 
to vote for a Democrat. Similarly, voters who 
voted for Cruz’s opponent may have been 
willing to vote for a Hispanic candidate but 
were actually motivated to vote for a 
Republican. In using the Cruz Index to adjust 
district boundaries in order to strengthen the 
minority population’s ability to elect its 
preferred candidate, the commissioners used 
a measure that equally reflected the ability to 
elect a Democratic candidate. 
The practical correlation between these two 
motivations was confirmed by the results of 
the 2012 election, conducted under the map 
that is the subject of this lawsuit. 
The legislators elected from districts 
identified by the Commission as minority 
ability-to-elect districts were all Democrats. 
As noted above, 19 of the 30 legislators 
elected from those districts were Hispanic or 
Native American. 
It is highly likely that the members of the 
Commission were aware of this correlation. 
Individuals sufficiently interested in 
government and politics to volunteer to serve 
on the Commission and to contribute 
hundreds of hours of time to the assignment 
would be aware of historic voting patterns. If 
they weren’t aware before, then they would 
necessarily have become aware of the strong 
correlation between minority ability-to-elect 
districts and Democratic-leaning districts in 
the course of their work. 
That knowledge could open the door to 
partisan motivations in both directions. If an 
individual member of the Commission were 
motivated to favor Democrats, that could 
have been accomplished under the guise of 
trying to strengthen minority ability-to-elect 
districts. Similarly, a member motivated to 
favor Republicans could have taken 
advantage of the process to concentrate 
minority population into certain districts in 
such a way as to leave a larger proportion of 
Republicans in the remaining districts. 
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Recognizing the difficulty of separating these 
two motivations, we find that the 
Commission was predominantly motivated 
by a legitimate consideration, in compliance 
with the Voting Rights Act. 
All five of the commissioners, including the 
Republicans, put a priority on achieving 
preclearance from the Department of Justice 
on the first try. To maximize the chances of 
achieving that goal, the Commission’s 
counsel and consultants recommended 
creating ten minority ability-to-elect districts. 
There was not a partisan divide on the 
question of whether ten districts was an 
appropriate target. 
After working to create ten such districts in 
the draft map, including Districts 24 and 26, 
all but Commissioner Stertz voted for the 
draft map. Commissioner Stertz’s reason for 
voting against the draft map, however, was 
not that he objected to the population 
deviations resulting from the creation of the 
ability-to-elect districts. Rather, he felt that 
the Commission had not paid sufficient 
attention to the other criteria that the Arizona 
Constitution requires the Commission to 
consider, such as keeping communities of 
interest together. 
In short, the bipartisan support for the 
changes leading to the population deviations 
in the draft map undermines the notion that 
partisanship, rather than compliance with the 
Voting Rights Act, was what motivated those 
deviations. 
We also find that the additional population 
deviation in these ten districts resulting from 
changes occurring between the passage of the 
draft map and the final map were primarily 
the result of efforts to obtain preclearance, 
some reservations by the Republican 
commissioners notwithstanding. After the 
draft map was completed, both Republican 
commissioners expressed concern about 
further depopulating minority ability-to-elect 
districts. At the hearing in which the 
Commission began work on the final map, 
Commissioner Stertz said that it was his 
“understanding that the maps as they are 
currently drawn do meet [the Voting Rights 
Act] criteria,” and that he didn’t want to 
“overpack Republicans into Republican 
districts . . . all being done on the shoulders 
of strengthening [Voting Rights Districts].” 
Commissioner Freeman shared 
Commissioner Stertz’s concerns. 
But the Commission’s counsel and 
consultants responded that there was 
uncertainty as to whether the map would 
preclear without strengthening those districts. 
And despite their initial reservations, the 
Republican commissioners did not vote 
against any of the change orders further 
strengthening the minority ability to elect in 
those districts. Commissioner Stertz even 
expressed support for these changes. In a 
public hearing that took place after the 
Commission made additional changes to the 
Voting Rights Act districts, Commissioner 
Stertz said that apart from a change order 
affecting Districts 8 and 11—which were not 
ability-to-elect districts and which we discuss 
next—he was “liking where the map has 
gone” and thought there was “a higher level 
of positive adjustments that have been made 
than the preponderance of the negative 
design of Districts 8 and 11.” At trial, 
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Commissioner Stertz testified that he relied 
on counsel’s advice that ten benchmark 
districts were necessary, and that he thought 
those ten districts were “better today than 
when they were first developed in draft 
maps.” The bipartisan support for the goal of 
preclearance, and the bipartisan support for 
the change orders strengthening these ten 
districts to meet that goal, support the finding 
that preclearance motivated the deviations. 
We make this finding despite plaintiffs’ 
contention that the selection of counsel and 
mapping consultant prove that Chairwoman 
Mathis was biased towards Democratic 
interests. We agree that giving Strategic 
Telemetry a perfect score is difficult to justify 
and reflects Mathis taking an ends oriented 
approach to the process to select her preferred 
firm, Strategic Telemetry. 
But even if Chairwoman Mathis preferred 
Strategic Telemetry for partisan reasons 
rather than the neutral reasons she expressed 
at the time, it would not prove that 
partisanship was the reason she supported the 
creation of ability-to-elect districts. As we 
have discussed, strong evidence shows that 
preclearing on the first attempt was a goal 
shared by all commissioners, not just 
Chairwoman Mathis. 
With respect to the changes to District 8 
occurring between the draft map and final 
map, the evidence shows that partisanship 
played some role. Though Commissioner 
McNulty first presented the possible changes 
to Districts 8 and 11 as an opportunity to 
make District 8 into a more competitive 
district, that simply meant making District 8 
into a more Democratic district. Because 
Districts 8 and 11 both favored Republicans 
before the proposed change, any shift in 
population between the two districts to make 
one of them more “competitive” necessarily 
increased the chances that a Democrat would 
win in one of those districts. In fact, in a close 
senate race in the newly drawn District 8, the 
Democrat did win. We might view the issue 
differently had Commissioner McNulty 
proposed to create a series of competitive 
districts out of both Democrat- and 
Republican-leaning districts, or applied some 
defined standards evenhandedly across the 
state. Instead, she sought to make one 
Republican-leaning district more amenable 
to Democratic interests. Moreover, the 
Commission was well aware of the partisan 
implications of the proposed change before 
adopting it. Both Republican commissioners 
made their opposition to the change, on the 
basis that it packed Republican voters into 
District 11 to aid Democratic prospects in 
District 8, known early on. 
Nonetheless, while partisanship played a role 
in the increased population deviation 
associated with changing District 8, so too 
did the preclearance goal play a part in 
motivating the change. While Commissioner 
McNulty originally suggested altering 
Districts 8 and 11 for the sake of 
competitiveness, she subsequently suggested 
that District 8 could become an ability-to-
elect district. Consultants and counsel 
endorsed this idea, in part because they had 
some doubts that District 26 would offer the 
ability to elect. It was not until after the 
consultants and counsel suggested pursuing 
these changes for the sake of preclearance 
that Chairwoman Mathis endorsed the idea. 
While the Commission ultimately concluded 
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that it could not make a true ability-to-elect 
district out of District 8, the submission to the 
Department of Justice did cite the changes 
made to that district’s boundaries in arguing 
that the plan deserved preclearance. 
Compliance with the Voting Rights Act was 
a substantial part of the motivation for the 
treatment of District 8. 
III. Resolution of Pretrial Motions 
The parties filed several motions prior to trial 
that this court disposed of summarily in its 
order dated February 22, 2013, with an 
opinion explaining the bases of the rulings to 
follow. Before we turn to our conclusions of 
law on the merits of the case, we explain our 
rulings on those motions. 
A. First Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings 
Defendants’ first motion for judgment on the 
pleadings sought two forms of relief. First, 
defendants requested dismissal of the 
commissioners based on legislative 
immunity. Second, defendants requested 
dismissal of plaintiffs’ state-law claim as 
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. We now 
explain why both forms of relief were 
granted. 
1. Standard of Judgment on the Pleadings 
Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate 
when there is “no issue of material fact in 
dispute, and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.” In assessing 
defendants’ motion, we “accept[ed] all 
factual allegations in the complaint as true 
and construe[d] them in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party.” 
2. The Commissioners Were Immune from 
Suit 
It was not entirely clear from the complaint 
but plaintiffs’ claims against the 
commissioners appeared to be based solely 
on the commissioners’ official acts. That is, 
plaintiffs’ claims rested on the 
commissioners’ actions in connection with 
the adoption of a particular final legislative 
map. Plaintiffs’ federal claim sought relief 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on their 
belief that the adoption of that map 
constituted a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The Commission argued 
legislative immunity forbade plaintiffs from 
pursuing this claim against the 
commissioners. 
“The Supreme Court has long held that state 
and regional legislators are absolutely 
immune from liability under § 1983 for their 
legislative acts.” This immunity applies to 
suits for money damages as well as requests 
for injunctive relief. Litigants often disagree 
over whether legislative immunity applies to 
a particular individual or to particular acts 
performed by an individual occupying a 
legislative office. But plaintiffs effectively 
conceded the commissioners qualified as 
legislators performing legislative acts. So 
instead of the normal lines of attack, 
plaintiffs argued that Ex parte Young, 209 
U.S. 123 (1908), prevented legislative 
immunity from requiring dismissal of the 
commissioners. Plaintiffs also claimed their 
request for attorneys’ fees permitted them to 
maintain suit against the commissioners. 
Neither argument was convincing. 
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Ex parte Young creates a legal fiction to avoid 
suits against state officials from being barred 
by the Eleventh Amendment. That fiction 
permits only “actions for prospective 
declaratory or injunctive relief against state 
officers in their official capacities for their 
alleged violations of federal law.” Plaintiffs 
did not cite any case where a court employed 
the fiction of Ex parte Young to avoid the 
otherwise applicable bar of legislative 
immunity. And existing case law reaches the 
opposite conclusion. Thus, Ex parte Young 
was not sufficient to overcome the bar of 
legislative immunity. 
Even if the court had agreed Ex parte Young 
might permit the naming of the 
commissioners in certain circumstances, it 
was particularly inapt here. Pursuant to Ex 
parte Young, the “state official sued ‘must 
have some connection with the enforcement 
of the act.’” That connection must be “fairly 
direct” and a “generalized duty to enforce 
state law or general supervisory power over 
the persons responsible for enforcing the 
challenged provision” is not sufficient.  
Accordingly, Ex parte Young does not allow 
a plaintiff to sue a state official who cannot 
provide the relief the plaintiff actually seeks. 
Under Arizona’s redistricting process, the 
commissioners have no direct connection to 
implementing the final legislative map nor do 
they have any supervisory power over those 
state officials implementing the final 
legislative map. Rather, it is the Secretary of 
State who enforces the map. Plaintiffs named 
the Secretary of State as a defendant and the 
Secretary of State conceded he is responsible 
for enforcing the map. In light of this, 
assuming Ex parte Young allows suit against 
the commissioners in some circumstances, 
the present suit did not qualify. 
Finally, plaintiffs argued the commissioners’ 
“presence [was] essential to maintaining 
section 1983 relief, which includes an award 
of attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.” 
In other words, plaintiffs wanted to keep the 
commissioners as defendants to ensure the 
possibility of plaintiffs recovering their 
attorneys’ fees. Plaintiffs did not cite, and the 
court could not find, any authority permitting 
the issue of fees to determine the propriety of 
keeping certain defendants in a suit. 
Moreover, plaintiffs’ issue regarding fees 
was a problem of their own creation in that 
the Secretary of State undoubtedly was an 
appropriate defendant and plaintiffs could 
have sought fees from him. At oral argument, 
however, plaintiffs’ counsel conceded the 
complaint did not seek an award of fees from 
the Secretary of State. The fact that plaintiffs 
made a choice not to seek fees against one 
party from whom they could clearly obtain 
fees was not a sufficient basis to allow 
plaintiffs to continue this suit against 
inappropriate parties. 
Neither Ex parte Young nor the impossibility 
of plaintiffs collecting fees from the 
remaining defendants justified keeping the 
commissioners as defendants. Therefore, the 
commissioners were entitled to judgment on 
the pleadings. 
3. Plaintiff’s State-Law Claim Was Barred by 
the Eleventh Amendment 
In addition to their § 1983 claim, plaintiffs 
also asserted a state-law claim that the final 
legislative map “violates the equal population 
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requirement of Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, 
§1(14)(B).” Defendants moved to dismiss 
this state-law claim as barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment pursuant to Pennhurst State 
School & Hospital v. Halderman. Plaintiffs 
did not dispute that a straightforward 
application of Pennhurst established their 
state-law claim was barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment. Instead, plaintiffs argued 
defendants waived their Eleventh 
Amendment immunity. Plaintiffs were 
incorrect. 
“For over a century now, [the Supreme 
Court] has consistently made clear that 
‘federal jurisdiction over suits against 
unconsenting States was not contemplated by 
the Constitution when establishing the 
judicial power of the United States.’” A state 
may choose to waive its immunity, but the 
“test for determining whether a State has 
waived its immunity from federal-court 
jurisdiction is a stringent one.” That test 
consists of determining whether “the state’s 
conduct during the litigation clearly 
manifest[ed] acceptance of the federal court’s 
jurisdiction or [was] otherwise incompatible 
with an assertion of Eleventh Amendment 
immunity.” For example, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded waiver occurred when a state 
appeared, actively litigated a case, and waited 
until the first day of trial to claim immunity. 
The situation in the present case was 
significantly different. 
Plaintiffs filed their original complaint on 
April 27, 2012. The parties then engaged in 
protracted pre-answer maneuvers that ended 
on November 16, 2012, when the court 
denied defendants’ motion to dismiss. 
Approximately three weeks later, defendants 
filed their answer asserting Eleventh 
Amendment immunity as well as a formal 
motion seeking judgment on the pleadings 
based on that immunity. Thus, while the case 
had been pending for over nine months at the 
time immunity was first asserted, the vast 
majority of that time was consumed by 
briefing and deciding a motion to dismiss. 
There was no meaningful delay between 
issuance of the order on the motion to dismiss 
and defendants’ assertion of the Eleventh 
Amendment. And while defendants might 
have raised immunity earlier, the actual 
sequence of events falls short of meeting the 
“stringent” test for establishing waiver. 
Therefore, defendants were entitled to 
judgment on the pleadings regarding 
plaintiffs’ state-law claim. 
B. Motion for Abstention 
Citing Railroad Commission of Texas v. 
Pullman Co., defendants moved to stay this 
case and defer hearing plaintiffs’ federal 
claim until plaintiffs obtained resolution of 
state-law issues in state court or, in the 
alternative, to certify any state-law questions 
to the Arizona Supreme Court. A majority of 
the court summarily denied the motion, with 
Judge Silver dissenting. 
Because “Congress imposed the duty upon 
all levels of the federal judiciary to give due 
respect to a suitor’s choice of a federal forum 
for the hearing and decision of his federal 
constitutional claims,” Pullman abstention is 
available only in narrowly limited, special 
circumstances. At its core, it “reflect[s] a 
doctrine of abstention appropriate to our 
federal system whereby the federal courts, 
‘exercising a wise discretion,’ restrain their 
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authority because of ‘scrupulous regard for 
the rightful independence of the state 
governments’ and for the smooth working of 
the federal judiciary.” “It is better practice, in 
a case raising a federal constitutional or 
statutory claim, to retain jurisdiction, rather 
than to dismiss.” Pullman abstention 
generally is appropriate only if three 
conditions are met: (1) the complaint 
“requires resolution of a sensitive question of 
federal constitutional law; (2) the 
constitutional question could be mooted or 
narrowed by a definitive ruling on the state 
law issues; and (3) the possibly determinative 
issue of state law is unclear.”  
Proper application of these conditions is 
meant to ensure federal courts defer “to state 
court interpretations of state law” while 
avoiding “‘premature constitutional 
adjudication’ that would arise from 
‘interpreting state law without the benefit of 
an authoritative construction by state 
courts’.”  
When deciding whether to exercise its 
discretionary equity powers to abstain, a 
court also must consider that “abstention 
operates to require piecemeal adjudication in 
many courts,” possibly “delaying ultimate 
adjudication on the merits for an undue 
length of time.” That delay can work 
substantial injustice because forcing “the 
plaintiff who has commenced a federal action 
to suffer the delay of state court proceedings 
might itself effect the impermissible chilling 
of the very constitutional right he seeks to 
protect.”  
Delay caused by abstention is especially 
problematic in voting rights cases. The Ninth 
Circuit noted in a redistricting case that due 
to the “special dangers of delay, courts have 
been reluctant to rely solely on traditional 
abstention principles in voting cases.” 
Expressing specific concern about the 
possibility of a potentially defective 
redistricting plan being left in place for an 
additional election cycle, it held that “before 
abstaining in voting cases, a district court 
must independently consider the effect that 
delay resulting from the abstention order will 
have on the plaintiff’s right to vote.” 
Given the importance of prompt adjudication 
of voting rights disputes, we exercised our 
discretion and decided not to abstain. The 
three conditions precedent to applying 
Pullman abstention identified above might 
have been present here, but we concluded that 
we should deny the motion without having to 
make that determination because of the likely 
delay that would have resulted. 
If we abstained as defendants requested, it 
was not likely that a resolution could be 
reached in time to put a new plan in place, if 
necessary, for the 2014 election cycle. Not 
only are voting rights disputes particularly 
important, they are also particularly complex. 
The last round of litigation over redistricting 
in Arizona, concerning Arizona’s legislative 
redistricting maps following the 2000 census, 
commenced in March 2002. The state trial 
court did not issue its decision until January 
2004, twenty-two months later. The appellate 
process did not conclude until the Arizona 
Supreme Court’s final decision in May 2009. 
The Commission’s motion for abstention 
came before us in December 2012. At the 
time of our decision on the motion, in 
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February 2013, no state court action was 
pending. Thus, deferring ruling on the federal 
claim would have delayed adjudication on 
the merits until a state court action was 
initiated and concluded, which likely would 
have precluded relief in time for the 2014 
election cycle. 
Furthermore, we could not resolve the state-
law issues as this case no longer included the 
state-law claim because the State of 
Arizona’s Eleventh Amendment immunity 
under Pennhurst precluded relief on that 
claim in federal court. And, it was also 
unclear whether any state law issues were 
implicated in plaintiffs’ remaining federal 
claim. In sum, this case is unlike the typical 
case warranting Pullman abstention, where 
the federal court will necessarily construe a 
state statute that the state courts themselves 
have not yet construed in order to decide the 
sensitive question of whether the state statute 
violates the federal Constitution. Here, by 
contrast, we did not need to resolve any 
question of state law as a predicate to 
deciding the merits of the federal claim. 
Therefore, we concluded that the special 
circumstances necessary for exercising 
discretion to defer ruling on plaintiffs’ 
federal claim did not exist. 
As an alternative to their request for 
abstention, defendants requested the court 
certify any state-law questions to the Arizona 
Supreme Court. A basic prerequisite for a 
court to certify a question to the Arizona 
Supreme Court is the existence of a pending 
issue of Arizona law not addressed by 
relevant Arizona authorities. In addition, 
Arizona’s certification statute requires the 
presence of a state-law question that “may be 
determinative” of the case. With the 
dismissal of plaintiffs’ state-law claim, there 
was no pending issue of Arizona law in this 
case. Therefore, the request in the alternative 
for certification also was denied. 
C. Motion for Protective Order 
Prior to discovery, the Commission moved 
for a protective order on the basis of 
legislative privilege. The Commission 
requested that the panel prohibit the 
depositions of the commissioners, their staff, 
and their consultants, as well as limit the 
scope of documents and interrogatories 
during discovery. We ordered the 
commissioners, at the time defendants in this 
case, to inform the court through counsel 
whether they would exercise legislative 
privilege if asked questions covered by the 
privilege. Commissioners Mathis, Herrera, 
and McNulty informed the court that they 
would invoke legislative privilege, while 
Commissioners Freeman and Stertz indicated 
they would waive it. We later denied the 
motion for a protective order, and we now 
explain the basis for doing so. 
Whether members of an independent 
redistricting commission can withhold 
relevant evidence or refuse to be deposed on 
the basis of legislative privilege is an issue of 
first impression. Neither the Ninth Circuit 
nor, as far as we can tell, any other court has 
decided whether members of an independent 
redistricting commission can assert 
legislative privilege in a challenge to the 
redistricting plan they produced. In the 
present litigation, we conclude that members 
of the Arizona Independent Redistricting 
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Commission cannot assert a legislative 
evidentiary privilege. 
State legislators do not have an absolute right 
to refuse deposition or discovery requests in 
connection with their legislative acts. In 
United States v. Gillock, the Supreme Court 
held that a state senator could not bar the 
introduction of evidence of his legislative 
acts in a federal criminal prosecution. 
Although Gillock could have claimed 
protection under the federal Speech or 
Debate Clause had he been a Member of 
Congress, the Court refused “to recognize an 
evidentiary privilege similar in scope to the 
Federal Speech or Debate Clause” for state 
legislators. The Court reasoned that 
“although principles of comity command 
careful consideration, . . . where important 
federal interests are at stake, as in the 
enforcement of federal criminal statutes, 
comity yields.” The Court in Gillock held that 
no legislative privilege exists in federal 
criminal prosecutions. It did not opine on the 
existence or extent of legislative privilege for 
state legislators in the civil context. 
The Ninth Circuit has recognized that state 
legislators and their aides may be protected 
by a legislative privilege. That case did not 
consider legislative privilege in the 
redistricting context, however, let alone 
whether citizen commissioners could assert 
the privilege. Moreover, its discussion of 
legislative privilege was limited. The 
decision did not indicate whether state 
legislators might assert an absolute 
legislative privilege in all civil litigation, or 
whether any privilege state legislators held 
must yield when significant competing 
interests exist. 
Whether or not state legislators might be able 
to assert in federal court an absolute 
legislative privilege in some circumstances, 
we do not think that the citizen 
commissioners here hold an absolute 
privilege. The Fourth Circuit has recognized, 
albeit not specifically in any redistricting 
cases, a seemingly absolute privilege against 
compulsory evidentiary process for state 
legislators and other officials acting in a 
legislative capacity. The purposes underlying 
an absolute privilege for state legislators are 
that it “allows them to focus on their public 
duties by removing the costs and distractions 
attending lawsuits [and] shields them from 
political wars of attrition in which their 
opponents try to defeat them through 
litigation rather than at the ballot box.” 
However, these are not persuasive reasons for 
extending the privilege to appointed citizen 
commissioners. Unlike legislators, the 
commissioners have no other public duties 
from which to be distracted. They cannot be 
defeated at the ballot box because they don’t 
stand for election. Indeed, the process is not 
supposed to be governed by what happens at 
the ballot box. The reason why Arizona 
transferred redistricting responsibilities from 
the legislature to the Commission was to 
separate the redistricting process from 
politics.  
In addition, to the extent comity is a rationale 
underlying legislative privilege, the Supreme 
Court has held that comity can be trumped by 
“important federal interests.” The federal 
government has a strong interest in securing 
the equal protection of voting rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution, an interest 
that can require the comity interests 
underlying legislative privilege to yield.  
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For similar reasons, we also refuse to extend 
a qualified legislative privilege to the 
commissioners in this case. Some courts have 
recognized a qualified privilege for state 
legislators in redistricting cases, in which a 
balancing test determines whether particular 
evidence is barred by the privilege. These 
cases did not involve an independent 
redistricting commission, however, and 
several of these cases even suggested that a 
legislative privilege would not apply to 
citizen commissioners.  
In determining whether a qualified privilege 
applies to state legislators, the courts that 
recognize a qualified privilege often balance 
the following factors: “(i) the relevance of the 
evidence sought to be protected; (ii) the 
availability of other evidence; (iii) the 
‘seriousness’ of the litigation and the issues 
involved; (iv) the role of the government in 
the litigation; and (v) the possibility of future 
timidity by government employees who will 
be forced to recognize that their secrets are 
violable.” These factors weigh heavily 
against recognizing a privilege for members 
of an independent redistricting commission. 
Because what motivated the Commission to 
deviate from equal district populations is at 
the heart of this litigation, evidence bearing 
on what justifies these deviations is highly 
relevant. In the event that plaintiffs’ claims 
have merit, and that the commissioners were 
motivated by an impermissible purpose, the 
commissioners would likely have kept out of 
the public record evidence making that 
purpose apparent.  
Perhaps most importantly, the nature and 
purpose of the Commission undermines the 
claim that allowing discovery will chill future 
deliberations by the Commission or deter 
future commissioners from serving. The 
commissioners will not be distracted from 
other duties because they have no other 
duties, and their future actions will not be 
inhibited because they have no future 
responsibility. And, as the majority in 
Marylanders observed: “We . . . deem it 
extremely unlikely that in the future private 
citizens would refuse to serve on a 
prestigious gubernatorial committee because 
of a concern that they might subsequently be 
deposed in connection with actions taken by 
the committee.”  
The parties dispute the relevance of some of 
plaintiffs’ requested discovery. But to the 
extent that plaintiffs have requested 
information not relevant to the central 
disputes in this litigation, the Commission 
need not rely on legislative privilege for 
protection. As stated in our order dated 
February 22, 2013, the court will not permit 
“discovery that is not central to the federal 
claims or any other inappropriate burden 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c).” 
In conclusion, the rationale supporting the 
legislative privilege does not support 
extending it to the members of the Arizona 
Independent Redistricting Commission in 
this case. 
IV. Conclusions of Law 
A. Burden of Proof 
The Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires that state 
legislative districts “must be apportioned on 
a population basis,” meaning that the state 
must “make an honest and good faith effort 
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to construct districts . . . as nearly of equal 
population as is practicable.” Some deviation 
in the population of legislative districts is 
constitutionally permissible, so long as the 
disparities are based on “legitimate 
considerations incident to the effectuation of 
a rational state policy.” Compactness, 
contiguity, respecting lines of political 
subdivisions, preserving the core of prior 
districts, and avoiding contests between 
incumbents are examples of the legitimate 
criteria that can justify minor population 
deviations, so long as these criteria are 
“nondiscriminatory” and “consistently 
applied.” 
Before requiring the state to justify its 
deviations, plaintiffs must make a prima facie 
case of a one-person, one-vote violation. By 
itself, the existence of minor deviations is 
insufficient to make out a prima facie case of 
discrimination.  
With respect to state legislative districts, the 
Supreme Court has said that, as a general 
matter, a “plan with a maximum population 
deviation under 10% falls within this 
category of minor deviations.” Although 
courts rarely strike down plans with a 
maximum deviation of less than ten percent, 
a maximum deviation below ten percent does 
not insulate the state from liability, but 
instead merely keeps the burden of proof on 
the plaintiff.  
Because the maximum deviation here is 
below ten percent, the burden is on plaintiffs 
to prove that the deviations did not result 
from the effectuation of legitimate 
redistricting policies. The primary way in 
which plaintiffs seek to carry their burden is 
by showing that the Commission deviated 
from perfect population equality out of a 
desire to increase the electoral prospects of 
Democrats at the expense of Republicans. 
Plaintiffs argue that partisanship is not a 
legitimate redistricting policy that can justify 
population deviations. 
The Supreme Court has not decided whether 
or not political gain is a legitimate state 
redistricting tool. Because we conclude that 
the redistricting plan here does not violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment whether or not 
partisanship is a legitimate redistricting 
policy, we need not resolve the question. For 
the purposes of this opinion, we assume, 
without deciding, that partisanship is not a 
valid justification for departing from perfect 
population equality. 
Even assuming that small deviations 
motivated by partisanship might offend the 
Equal Protection Clause, plaintiffs will not 
necessarily sustain their burden simply by 
showing that partisanship played some role. 
The Supreme Court has not specifically 
addressed what a plaintiff must prove in a 
one-person, one-vote challenge when 
population deviations result from mixed 
motives, some legitimate and some 
illegitimate. 
This panel has not reached a consensus on 
what the standard should be. We conclude, 
for purposes of this decision, that plaintiffs 
must, at a minimum, demonstrate that 
illegitimate criteria predominated over 
legitimate criteria. 
Finally, we reject plaintiffs’ argument that 
strict scrutiny applies to the extent that the 
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Commission claims that racial motivations 
drove the deviations from population 
equality. All of the cases cited in support of 
this argument involve racial gerrymandering 
claims. As plaintiffs concede, this is not a 
racial gerrymandering case. Nor have 
plaintiffs specifically articulated how, in the 
absence of a claim of racial discrimination, 
strict scrutiny helps their case. Suppose that, 
applying strict scrutiny, we concluded that 
the Commission employed race as a 
redistricting factor in a manner not narrowly 
tailored to advance a compelling 
governmental interest. That may establish a 
racial gerrymandering violation, but it would 
not establish a one-person, one-vote 
violation. We decline to reduce plaintiffs’ 
burden by importing strict scrutiny into the 
one-person, one-vote context, a context in 
which the Supreme Court has made clear we 
owe state legislators substantial deference.  
In sum, plaintiffs must prove that the 
deviations were not motivated by legitimate 
considerations or, if motivated in part by 
legitimate considerations, that illegitimate 
considerations predominated over legitimate 
considerations. Because we have found that 
the deviations in the Commission’s plan were 
largely motivated by efforts to gain 
preclearance under the Voting Rights Act, we 
turn next to whether compliance with Section 
5 of the Voting Rights Act is a permissible 
justification for minor population deviations. 
B. Compliance with the Voting Rights Act as 
a Legitimate Redistricting Policy 
The Supreme Court has not specifically 
spoken to whether compliance with the 
Voting Rights Act is a redistricting policy 
that can justify minor population deviations. 
The Court has not provided an exhaustive list 
of permissible criteria. Among the legitimate 
criteria it has approved are compactness, 
contiguity, respecting municipal lines, 
preserving the cores of prior districts, and 
avoiding contests between incumbents. In the 
context of racial gerrymandering cases, the 
Court has assumed, without deciding, that the 
Voting Rights Act is a compelling state 
interest. 
We conclude that compliance with the 
Voting Rights Act is among the legitimate 
redistricting criteria that can justify minor 
population deviations. If compliance with the 
Voting Rights Act is not a legitimate, rational 
state policy on par with compactness and 
contiguity, we doubt that the Court would 
have assumed in Vera that it is a compelling 
state interest. Neither plaintiffs nor the 
dissenting opinion have offered a sensible 
explanation. 
More importantly, we fail to see how 
compliance with a federal law concerning 
voting rights—compliance which is 
mandatory for a redistricting plan to take 
effect—cannot justify minor population 
deviations when, for example, protecting 
incumbent legislators can. This is, perhaps, 
our primary disagreement with the dissenting 
opinion. It too narrowly defines the reasons 
that may properly be relied upon by a state to 
draw state legislative districts with wider 
variations in population. 
The dissenting opinion correctly notes, at 19–
20, that states are required to establish 
congressional districts of essentially equal 
population. It acknowledges, as it must, that 
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state legislative districts are not subject to as 
strict a standard. A state legislative plan may 
include some variation in district population 
in pursuit of legitimate interests. 
The dissenting opinion also acknowledges, at 
17 & 23, that obtaining preclearance under 
the Voting Rights Act was a legitimate 
objective in redistricting. But it contends that 
pursuit of that objective could not justify 
even minor variations in population among 
districts. In practical terms, the dissenting 
opinion would apparently permit the 
Commission to consider the preclearance 
objective only in drawing lines dividing 
districts of equal sizes. 
The Supreme Court has made it clear, 
however, that states have greater latitude 
when it comes to state legislative districts. 
The Equal Protection Clause does not require 
exact equality. In drawing lines for state 
legislative districts, “[a]ny number of 
consistently applied legislative policies 
might justify some variance.” Obtaining 
preclearance under the Voting Rights Act 
appears to us to be as legitimate a reason as 
other policies that have been recognized, 
such as avoiding contests between 
incumbents and respecting municipal lines. 
Plaintiffs and the dissenting opinion, at 19, 
attempt to reframe the inquiry, arguing that 
the text of the Voting Rights Act itself does 
not specifically authorize population 
deviations. That is correct; there is no 
specific authorization for population 
deviations in the text of the legislation. But 
neither is there specific, textual authorization 
for population deviations in any of the other 
legitimate, often uncodified legislative 
policies that the Supreme Court has held can 
justify population deviations. For example, 
the Supreme Court’s conclusion that 
compactness can justify population 
deviations does not turn on the existence of a 
Compactness Act that specifically authorizes 
population deviations for the sake of compact 
districts. The question is not whether the 
Voting Rights Act specifically authorizes 
population deviations, but whether seeking 
preclearance under the Voting Rights Act is a 
legitimate, rational state goal in the 
redistricting process. We are satisfied that it 
is. 
The dissenting opinion, at 19, goes a step 
further and argues that the Voting Rights Act 
itself prohibits any deviation in exact 
population equality for the purpose of 
complying with the Voting Rights Act. No 
court has so held, and we note that plaintiffs 
themselves have alleged that the Arizona 
redistricting plan violates the Equal 
Protection Clause, not that it violates the 
Voting Rights Act. We do not read the Act in 
the same way that the dissenting opinion 
does. 
Plaintiffs also argue that the Department of 
Justice does not purport to be able to force 
jurisdictions to depopulate districts to comply 
with Section 5. In a document entitled 
“Guidance Concerning Redistricting Under 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act,” the 
Department advises: “Preventing 
retrogression under Section 5 does not 
require jurisdictions to violate the one-
person, one-vote principle.” But the 
Guidance goes on to make clear that, in the 
Department’s view, Section 5 might in some 
cases require minor population deviations in 
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state legislative plans. When a jurisdiction 
asserts that it cannot avoid retrogression 
because of population shifts, the Department 
looks to see whether there are reasonable, less 
retrogressive alternatives, as the existence of 
these alternatives could disprove the 
jurisdiction’s assertion that retrogression is 
unavoidable. For state legislative 
redistricting, “a plan that would require 
significantly greater overall population 
deviations is not considered a reasonable 
alternative.” The implication is that the 
Department would consider a plan with 
slightly greater population deviation to be a 
reasonable plan that would avoid 
retrogression—in other words, the 
Department might hold a state in violation of 
Section 5 if it could have avoided 
retrogression with the aid of minor 
population deviations. To be clear, we do not 
base our understanding of the law upon the 
Department’s interpretation, but plaintiffs 
have cited the Department’s Guidance as 
supporting its position, and we do not agree. 
In our view, the Department’s Guidance 
expresses a conclusion that avoiding 
retrogression can justify minor population 
deviations. That is our conclusion, as well, 
based on our own view of the law, separate 
and apart from the Department’s position. 
This conclusion is not altered by the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Shelby County v. 
Holder, which was decided after the 
legislative map in question here was drawn 
and implemented. In Shelby County, the 
Court held that Section 4(b) of the Voting 
Rights Act, which contained the formula 
determining which states were subject to the 
preclearance requirement, was 
unconstitutional. The Court did not hold that 
the preclearance requirement of Section 5 
was unconstitutional, but its ruling rendered 
the preclearance requirement inapplicable to 
previously covered jurisdictions, at least until 
Congress enacts a new coverage formula that 
passes constitutional muster.  
Plaintiffs and the dissenting opinion, at 15–
17, argue that this ruling applies retroactively 
to this case, such that the Commission was 
not required to obtain preclearance for the 
legislative map at issue, thereby nullifying 
the pursuit of preclearance as a justification 
for population deviations.  
But that approach reads too much into Shelby 
County. The Court did not hold that Section 
5 of the Voting Rights Act, the section that 
sets out the preclearance process, was 
unconstitutional. The Court’s opinion stated 
explicitly to the contrary: “We issue no 
holding on § 5 itself, only on the coverage 
formula.” The Court did not hold that 
Arizona or any other jurisdiction could not be 
required to comply with the preclearance 
process, if a proper formula was in place for 
determining which jurisdictions are properly 
subject to the preclearance process. To the 
contrary, the Court’s opinion expressly 
faulted Congress for not updating the 
coverage formula, implying that a properly 
updated coverage formula that “speaks to 
current conditions” would withstand 
challenge. 
If we had before us a challenge to the 
coverage formula set forth in Section 4 of the 
Voting Rights Act, we would unquestionably 
be expected to apply Shelby County 
“retroactively,” and we would do so. That is, 
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however, not the issue before us. Neither is 
the issue before us whether the legislative 
map violated or complied with the Voting 
Rights Act. 
Rather, the issue is whether the Commission 
was motivated by compliance with that law 
in deviating from the ideal population. In 
other contexts, where the issue is not whether 
the actions of public officials actually 
complied with the law but instead whether 
they might have reasonably thought to have 
been in compliance, we do not expect those 
public officials to predict the future course of 
legal developments. 
For example, in the qualified immunity 
context, the issue is whether the actions of 
public officials “could reasonably have been 
thought consistent with the rights they are 
alleged to have violated.” There, we assess 
their actions based on law “clearly 
established” at the time their actions were 
taken. Similarly, in the Fourth Amendment 
context, we decline to apply the exclusionary 
rule when a police officer conducts a search 
in reasonable reliance on a later invalidated 
statute. We generally decline to require the 
officer to predict whether the statute will later 
be held unconstitutional, unless the statute is 
so clearly unconstitutional that a reasonable 
officer would have known so at the time.  
Arizona was not the only state that drew new 
district lines following the 2010 census. The 
other states and jurisdictions subject to 
preclearance under the Voting Rights Act 
engaged in the same exercise. Nothing in 
Shelby County suggests that all those maps 
are now invalid, and we are aware of no court 
that has reached such a conclusion, despite 
the concern expressed in the dissenting 
opinion, at 15, that leaving the maps in place 
“would give continuing force to Section 5.” 
To repeat, Shelby County did not hold 
Section 5 to be unconstitutional. Neither did 
it hold that any effort by a state to comply 
with Section 5 was improper. 
In redistricting, we should expect states to 
comply with federal voting rights law as it 
stands at the time rather than attempt to 
predict future legal developments and 
selectively comply with voting rights law in 
accordance with their predictions. 
Accordingly, so long as the Commission was 
motivated by the requirements of the Voting 
Rights Act as it reasonably understood them 
at the time, compliance with the Voting 
Rights Act served as a legitimate justification 
for minor population deviations. 
C. Application to 2012 Legislative Map 
Plaintiffs argue that Districts 8, 24, and 26 
could not have been motivated by 
compliance with the Voting Rights Act. They 
argue that only eight ability-to-elect districts 
existed in the benchmark plan. Because the 
Commission had created eight ability-to-
elect districts even without Districts 8, 24, 
and 26, and avoiding retrogression only 
requires creating as many ability-to-elect 
districts as are in the benchmark plan, 
plaintiffs argue that the Voting Rights Act 
could not have motivated the creation of 
these three districts. In essence, plaintiffs 
urge us to determine how many ability-to-
elect districts were strictly necessary to gain 
preclearance and to hold that deviations from 
the creation of purported ability-to-elect 
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districts above that number cannot be 
justified by Voting Rights Act compliance. 
This argument runs into several problems. 
First of all, plaintiffs have not given the court 
a basis to independently determine that there 
existed only eight ability-to-elect districts in 
the benchmark plan. Plaintiffs point to the 
fact that the Commission argued that there 
were eight benchmark districts in its 
submission to the Department of Justice.  
But the submission to the Department was an 
advocacy document. The Commission was 
motivated to make the strongest case for 
preclearance by arguing for a low number of 
benchmark ability-to-elect districts and a 
high number of new ability-to-elect districts. 
The Commission’s consultants and counsel, 
in public meetings, had advised the 
Commission that their analysis suggested the 
existence of ten benchmark districts. The 
discrepancy between the advice given in 
meetings and the arguments put forth in the 
submission to the Department of Justice is 
not a sufficient basis for the court to conclude 
that there were only eight ability-to-elect 
districts in the benchmark plan. Moreover, 
while plaintiffs criticize elements of the 
functional analysis performed by the 
Commission’s consultants, plaintiffs have 
not provided the court with any functional 
analysis of their own or from any other source 
showing which districts provided minorities 
with the ability to elect in either the 
benchmark plan or the current plan that they 
challenge. In short, even if we were inclined 
to independently determine how many 
ability-to-elect districts existed in the 
benchmark plan, plaintiffs have not carried 
their burden to show that there were only 
eight. 
In any event, we need not determine whether 
the minor population deviations were strictly 
necessary to gain preclearance. Plaintiffs 
presented testimony from an expert witness, 
Thomas Hofeller, to demonstrate that a plan 
could have been drawn with smaller 
population deviations. Dr. Hofeller prepared 
such a map, but he acknowledged that he had 
not taken other state interests into account, 
including interests clearly identified as 
legitimate, nor had he performed a racial 
polarization or functional analysis, so that 
map did not necessarily present a practical 
alternative. Because he concluded, contrary 
to the Commission and its counsel and 
consultants, that the benchmark number for 
minority ability-to-elect districts in the prior 
plan was only eight (seven Hispanic districts 
and one Native American district), his belief 
that his alternative map would have been 
precleared by the Justice Department was 
disputed. More importantly, evidence that a 
map could have been drawn with smaller 
population deviations does not prove that 
illegitimate criteria motivated the deviations.  
Rather, it is enough that the minor population 
deviations are “based on legitimate 
considerations.” In other words, we will 
invalidate the plan only if the evidence 
demonstrates that the deviations were not the 
result of reasonable, good-faith efforts to 
comply with the Voting Rights Act. We will 
not invalidate the plan simply because the 
Commission might have been able to adopt a 
map that would have precleared with less 
population deviation if we determine that in 
adopting its map the Commission was 
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genuinely motivated by compliance with the 
Voting Rights Act. 
This approach is in accord both with the 
deference federal courts afford to states in 
creating their own legislative districts and the 
realities of the preclearance process. The 
Department of Justice does not inform 
jurisdictions of the number of districts 
necessary for preclearance ahead of time. Nor 
could the Commission be certain which 
districts in any tentative plan would be 
recognized by the Department as having an 
ability to elect. These determinations are 
complex and not subject to mathematical 
certainty. For us to determine the minimum 
number of ability-to-elect districts necessary 
to comply with the Voting Rights Act and 
then to strike down a plan if minor population 
deviations resulted from efforts that we 
concluded were not strictly necessary for 
compliance would create a very narrow target 
for the state. It would also deprive states of 
the flexibility to which the Supreme Court’s 
one-person, one-vote jurisprudence entitles 
them in legislative redistricting 
That deviations from perfect population 
equality in this case resulted in substantial 
part because of the Commission’s pursuit of 
preclearance is evidenced both by its 
deliberations and by advice given to the 
Commission by its counsel and consultants. 
Plaintiffs cite Larios v. Cox for the 
proposition that advice of counsel is not a 
defense to constitutional infirmities in a 
redistricting plan.  In Larios, state legislators 
mistakenly believed that any plan with a 
maximum deviation below ten percent was 
immune from a one-person, one-vote 
challenge and then created a plan with a 
maximum deviation of 9.98 percent 
deviations in the pursuit of illegitimate 
objectives. In holding that the plan violated 
the one-person, one-vote principle, the court 
held that reliance on faulty legal advice did 
not remedy the constitutional infirmity in the 
plan. But in Larios, there was no question that 
the legislature had pursued illegitimate 
policies. The legislature had taken counsel’s 
advice to mean that it did not need to have 
legitimate reasons for deviating. The court 
held that they did need legitimate reasons for 
deviating, and the Supreme Court affirmed. 
Here, by contrast, what motivated the 
Commission is at issue. Counsel’s advice 
does not insulate the Commission from 
liability, but it is probative of the 
Commission’s intent. That is not to say that 
reliance on the advice of counsel will in all 
cases demonstrate the good-faith pursuit of a 
legitimate objective. The advice might be so 
unreasonable that the Commission could not 
reasonably have believed it, or other evidence 
may show that the Commission was not 
acting pursuant to the advice. But the 
Commission’s attorneys gave reasonable 
advice as to how to pursue what they 
identified as a legitimate objective, and the 
Commission appeared to act in accordance 
with that advice. That is strong evidence that 
the Commission’s actions were indeed in the 
pursuit of that objective, one that we have 
concluded for ourselves was legitimate. 
With respect to the ten districts presented to 
the Department of Justice as ability-to-elect 
districts, including Districts 24 and 26, the 
evidence before us shows that the population 
deviations were predominantly based on 
legitimate considerations. The Commission 
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was advised by its consultants and counsel 
that it needed to create at least ten districts. 
Given the uncertainty in determining the 
number of districts, and that one of the 
Commission’s highest priorities was to 
preclear the first time, the Commission was 
not unreasonable in acting pursuant to this 
advice. As noted in our findings of fact, the 
target of ten districts was not controversial 
and had bipartisan support. All 
commissioners, including the Republican 
appointees, believed that ten districts were 
appropriate. 
A somewhat closer question is presented by 
the changes to the district boundaries, 
including Districts 24 and 26, made between 
the draft map and the final map. The draft 
racial polarization analysis prepared by King 
and Strasma indicated that minorities would 
be able to elect candidates of their choice in 
all ten proposed ability-to-elect districts in 
the draft map. Plaintiffs argue that no further 
changes could be justified by the 
Commission’s desire to obtain preclearance 
because the draft map met that goal. The 
preclearance decision was not going to be 
made by King and Strasma, however, and the 
Commission could not be sure what it would 
take to satisfy the Department of Justice. The 
Commission was advised to try to strengthen 
the minority ability-to-elect districts even 
further, and it was not unreasonable under the 
circumstances for the Commission to 
undertake that effort. With regard to the ten 
ability-to-elect districts, we conclude that 
plaintiffs have not carried their burden of 
demonstrating that no legitimate motive 
caused the deviations or that partisanship 
predominated. Creation of these districts was 
primarily a consequence of the 
Commission’s good-faith efforts to comply 
with the Voting Rights Act and to obtain 
preclearance. 
District 8 presents an even closer question, 
because the evidence clearly shows that 
partisanship played some role in its creation. 
Commissioner McNulty presented the 
possible change to Districts 8 and 11 as an 
opportunity to make District 8 into a more 
competitive district. We do not doubt that the 
creation of competitive districts is a rational, 
legitimate state interest. But to justify 
population deviations, legitimate state 
criteria must be “nondiscriminatory” and 
“consistently applied.” Commissioner 
McNulty’s competitiveness proposal was 
neither applied consistently nor in a 
nondiscriminatory fashion. It was applied to 
improve Democratic prospects in one single 
district. It was not applied to districts 
favoring Democrats as well as to those 
favoring Republicans, so competitiveness 
cannot justify the deviation. We have found 
that partisanship motivated the Democratic 
commissioners to support this change, since 
both expressed support for it before there was 
any mention of presenting District 8 to the 
Department of Justice for the sake of 
preclearance. 
But while partisanship played some role, 
plaintiffs have not carried their burden to 
demonstrate that partisanship predominated 
over legitimate factors. Because 
Commissioner McNulty’s change only 
slightly increased the level of population 
inequality in District 8 and the other affected 
districts, let alone the plan as a whole, 
plaintiffs must make a particularly strong 
showing to carry their burden. As noted in 
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our findings, the changes in population 
inequality from draft map to final map that 
can be attributed to the vote on 
Commissioner McNulty’s proposed change 
is an increase of 0.7 percent deviation in 
District 8, a decrease of 1.6 percent in District 
11, an increase of 2.4 percent in District 12, 
and an increase of 1.4 percent in District 16. 
Altogether, the change resulted in a small 
decrease in deviation in one district and small 
increases in deviation in three districts. While 
there is some increase in deviation that can be 
attributed in part to partisanship, it is not a 
particularly large increase. 
We have also found that the preclearance 
goal played a role in the change to District 8. 
Consultants and counsel suggested pursuing 
it for the sake of preclearance, and only then 
did Chairwoman Mathis endorse the idea. 
Without her vote, there would not have been 
a majority to adopt that change. In light of the 
small deviations resulting from this change 
order and because legitimate efforts to 
achieve preclearance also drove the decision, 
plaintiffs have not proved that partisanship 
predominated over legitimate reasons for the 
Commission as a whole. 
We have concluded that compliance with the 
Voting Rights Act is a legitimate state policy 
that can justify minor population deviations, 
that the deviations in the map in large part 
resulted from this goal, and that plaintiffs 
have failed to show that other, illegitimate 
motivations predominated over the 
preclearance motivation. Therefore, 
plaintiffs’ challenge to the map under the 
one-person, one-vote principle fails. 
V. Conclusion 
We find in favor of the Commission on 
plaintiffs’ claim that the Commission’s 
legislative redistricting plan violated the one-
person, one-vote principle of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. We order the entry of judgment 
for the Commission. 
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“New Arizona Redistricting Case Gets U.S. High Court Review” 
Bloomberg 
Greg Stohr 
June 30, 2015 
The U.S. Supreme Court will take up a new 
redistricting case from Arizona, agreeing to 
decide whether an independent commission 
violated the Constitution by watering down 
the influence of Republican votes. 
 
The decision to hear the case comes a day 
after the court upheld the redistricting 
commission against a constitutional 
challenge from the state’s Republican-
controlled legislature. The court said voters 
could decide to have congressional districts 
drawn by the independent panel instead of the 
state legislature. 
 
The new case centers on state legislative 
districts. A group of Arizona residents say 
their votes are being diluted for the sake of 
partisan advantage in violation of the 
constitutional requirement of “one person, 
one vote.” 
 
The commission’s plan “intended to ‘pack’ 
non-Hispanic white Republican voters in 
overpopulated districts to gain an advantage 
for the Democrats by overweighting the votes 
of Democratic voters in the underpopulated 
districts,” the voters, led by Wesley W. 
Harris, argued in court papers. 
The commission said a three-judge panel 
correctly concluded that the population 
deviations weren’t driven by partisan 
motivations and instead stemmed from an 
effort to comply with a provision of the 
Voting Rights Act. 
 
That provision, since undercut by a 2013 
Supreme Court decision, required federal 
preclearance of new districts to protect 
minority voting rights. 
Voting Rights Act 
 
A desire to comply with the Voting Rights 
Act “is a rational state policy capable of 
justifying minor deviations in population,” 
the commission argued. 
 
The case becomes the second Supreme Court 
test of the “one person, one vote” principle 
during the nine-month term that starts in 
October. The court previously agreed to hear 
a Texas case concerning whether states can 
allocate legislative seats on the basis of total 
population, rather than the number of eligible 
voters. 
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“Justices Agree to Hear Dispute over Union Fees, 
Reapportionment” 
The Washington Post 
Robert Barnes 
June 30, 2015 
 
[Excerpt; section discussing Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Assoc. omitted] 
 
Arizona reapportionment 
The court also will return to the issue of 
reapportionment in Arizona, just a day after 
validating an independent commission to 
which the state’s voters delegated 
redistricting powers.  
The case says that board, the Arizona 
Independent Redistricting Commission, did 
not properly reapportion the state legislative 
districts after the last census. 
On Monday, the Supreme Court upheld the 
decision of Arizona voters to create the 
commission to draw election districts in an 
attempt to reduce partisan gerrymandering. 
The court ruled 5 to 4 that cutting the 
legislature out of the redistricting process did 
not violate the Constitution’s Election 
Clause, which says that the times, places and 
manner of holding elections “shall be 
prescribed in each state by the Legislature 
thereof.” 
On Tuesday, the court accepted a challenge 
brought by a group of Republican voters who 
said the commission’s 2012 state legislative 
maps violated the “one person, one vote” 
requirement of population equality among 
districts because GOP voters were shifted to 
increase minority voters in others. 
The use of race and partisanship were 
attempts to persuade the Justice Department 
to approve the plans under the Voting Rights 
Act. But since then, the Supreme Court has 
done away with the pre-clearance 
requirement. 
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. wrote 
extensively about the new case in his dissent 
to the court’s ruling Monday. 
A district court panel ruled that partisanship 
played some role in the development of the 
legislative district plan but did not rise to the 
level of a constitutional violation. 
“A finding that the partisanship in the 
redistricting plan did not violate the 
Constitution hardly proves that the 
commission is operating free of partisan 
influence — and certainly not that it complies 
with the Elections Clause,” Roberts wrote. 
The case is Harris v. Arizona Independent 
Redistricting Commission. 
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“Arizona Republicans Lose Legal Challenges to State Voting Map” 
Bloomberg Business 
Edvard Pettersson 
April 29, 2014 
Arizona Republican voters lost a challenge to 
an electoral districts map for the state 
assembly that they said favors Democrats by 
putting too many voters in districts with 
Republican majorities. 
A panel of federal judges voted 2-1 to reject 
the argument that the redrawn map by the 
state’s Independent Redistricting 
Commission violated the constitutional rights 
of Republican voters to equal protection and 
can’t be used in elections. 
“We conclude that the population deviations 
were primarily a result of good-faith efforts 
to comply with the Voting Rights Act, and 
that even though partisanship played some 
role in the design of the map, the Fourteenth 
Amendment challenge fails,” according to 
the panel’s majority opinion. 
The Republican voters, at a trial in Phoenix, 
accused the Independent Redistricting 
Commission of “a pattern of discriminatory 
intent” by concentrating Republicans in 
districts that have a higher average 
population than other voting districts. 
Redistricting is intended to ensure that 
members of the U.S. House of 
Representatives and state legislatures 
represent roughly equal populations. From 
the first Congress, party leaders have 
exploited the map-making exercise by 
weakening the voting strength of some 
groups to gain an advantage, a practice 
known as gerrymandering. 
David Cantelme, a lawyer for the plaintiffs, 
didn’t immediately respond to a phone call to 
his office seeking comment on today’s ruling. 
Arizona Senate 
Arizona has 30 members in its Senate and 60 
members in its House of Representatives. 
Each district is represented by one senator 
and two house members. 
Under the redistricting plan completed last 
year, 16 of the 17 legislative districts with a 
Republican plurality -- more registered 
Republican voters than any voters registered 
with another party -- exceed the ideal 
population of 213,067, plaintiffs said in their 
complaint. 
Only two of the districts with a Democratic 
plurality exceed the ideal population, they 
said. 
In a dissenting opinion today, U.S. District 
Judge Neil Wake said the redistricting 
commission “has been coin-clipping the 
currency of our democracy, everyone’s equal 
vote, and giving all the shavings to one party, 
for no valid reason.” The case is Harris v. 
Arizona Independent Redistricting 
Commission, 12-cv-00894, U.S. District 
Court, District of Arizona (Phoenix). 
  
 108 
“Supreme Court Upholds Arizona’s Independent Redistricting 
Commission” 
The Huffington Post 
Samantha Lachman 
June 29, 2015 
 
The Supreme Court ruled 5-4 on Monday that 
a voter-approved independent redistricting 
commission in Arizona is constitutional. The 
conservative wing of the court was in the 
minority. 
 
In response to complaints that the state 
legislature was engaging in partisan 
gerrymandering of congressional districts, 
Arizona voters approved an independent 
commission to draw district lines in a 2000 
ballot initiative. The commission has two 
Republicans and two Democrats, who 
legislative leaders choose from a list 
composed by the state's Commission on 
Appellate Court Appointments, in addition to 
a chairman who may not be a member of 
either party. 
 
Republican legislators sued after the 2012 
election, arguing that they shouldn't be 
completely cut out of the district-drawing 
process. 
 
The case before the Supreme Court -- 
Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona 
Independent Redistricting Commission -- 
hinged on one word: "legislature." It arose 
out of a debate over the Constitution's 
elections clause, which dictates that the 
"times, places, and manner" of federal 
elections "shall be prescribed in each state by 
the legislature thereof." 
In oral arguments before the court in early 
March, the court's four more conservative 
justices, plus Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, 
the swing vote, seemed skeptical of the 
commission's argument that "legislature" can 
also mean the legislative process, including 
ballot initiatives. 
 
But in its decision, the court's majority, 
including Kennedy, wrote that overturning 
the independent commission would go 
against the spirit of the elections clause. 
 
"The Elections Clause permits the people of 
Arizona to provide for redistricting by 
independent commission," the decision read. 
"The history and purpose of the Clause weigh 
heavily against precluding the people of 
Arizona from creating a commission 
operating independently of the state 
legislature to establish congressional 
districts. Such preclusion would also run up 
against the Constitution’s animating 
principle that the people themselves are the 
originating source of all the powers of 
government." 
 
The decision continued: "The Framers may 
not have imagined the modern initiative 
process in which the people’s legislative 
power is coextensive with the state 
legislature’s authority, but the invention of 
the initiative was in full harmony with the 
Constitution’s conception of the people as the 
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font of governmental power. It would thus be 
perverse to interpret 'Legislature' in the 
Elections Clause to exclude lawmaking by 
the people, particularly when such 
lawmaking is intended to advance the 
prospect that Members of Congress will in 
fact be 'chosen... by the People of the several 
States.'" 
 
In their dissenting decision, the court's 
conservative justices wrote that the majority 
was ignoring evidence and "relying instead 
on disconnected observations about direct 
democracy, a contorted interpretation of an 
irrelevant statute, and naked appeals to public 
policy." 
 
"Nowhere does the majority explain how a 
constitutional provision that vests 
redistricting authority in 'the Legislature' 
permits a State to wholly exclude 'the 
Legislature' from redistricting," the minority 
decision continued. "Arizona’s Commission 
might be a noble endeavor -- although it does 
not seem so 'independent' in practice— but 
the 'fact that a given law or procedure is 
efficient, convenient, and useful... will not 
save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.' No 
matter how concerned we may be about 
partisanship in redistricting, this Court has no 
power to gerrymander the Constitution." 
 
The Supreme Court has previously ruled that 
“legislature” can refer to legislative power 
and the legislative process, as exercised by 
the people through direct democracy, since 
the Constitution's framers at the time didn't 
foresee how initiatives and referenda would 
become the law in states like Arizona. 
 
As Justice Elena Kagan pointed out in 
March's oral arguments, state legislatures 
have previously been cut out of election 
administration issues with the advent of 
measures to instate voter identification and 
mail-in voting, as established by initiatives in 
in Mississippi and Oregon, respectively. 
 
"There are zillions of these laws," Kagan 
said. "So would all of those be 
unconstitutional as well?" 
 
The legislature's attorney, Paul Clement, said 
those election laws wouldn't be at risk 
because they didn't take power away from the 
legislature, as the creation of the Arizona 
Independent Redistricting Commission did. 
 
Kennedy, who is often key to Supreme Court 
decisions, took a different tack during the 
oral arguments, noting that U.S. senators 
were chosen by state legislatures until 1913, 
when a constitutional amendment gave that 
power to the people. 
 
"It seems to me that history works very much 
against you," Kennedy told the commission's 
attorney. 
 
In Monday's ruling, the court's conservative 
justices used the example of the amendment 
allowing for the election of U.S. senators to 
make their point in the dissent that the 
independent commission should have been 
ruled unconstitutional. 
 
"What chumps!" the minority decision 
taunted, saying Arizonans who ratified the 
17th Amendment should have realized they 
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simply could have interpreted "the 
legislature" to mean "the people." 
 
"The Court today performs just such a magic 
trick with the Elections Clause," the dissent 
continues. "That Clause vests congressional 
redistricting authority in 'the Legislature' of 
each State. An Arizona ballot initiative 
transferred that authority from 'the 
Legislature' to an 'Independent Redistricting 
Commission.' The majority approves this 
deliberate constitutional evasion by doing 
what the proponents of the Seventeenth 
Amendment dared not: revising 'the 
Legislature' to mean 'the people.' The Court’s 
position has no basis in the text, structure, or 
history of the Constitution, and it contradicts 
precedents from both Congress and this 
Court." 
 
Arizona's legislators had initiated no legal 
action against the commission until after the 
2010 census, when the commission drew four 
safe seats for the GOP, two for Democrats 
and three toss-up districts -- all of which went 
for Democrats in 2012. After that election, 
Republicans began attacking the 
commission's members as unaccountable to 
the people since they are unelected. 
 
Arizona Democrats were thrilled by the 
ruling. 
 
“Arizona voters said that they want an open, 
transparent and fair redistricting process, 
which is why they established the 
Independent Redistricting Commission," 
state House Democratic Leader Eric Meyer 
said in a statement. "The Supreme Court 
decision today protects the will of the voters 
and will help prevent partisanship and 
political ambition from influencing the 
redistricting process. Our state is better 
served by having a body, independent of the 
Legislature, in charge of this important task.” 
 
The case the Supreme Court heard could have 
had potential implications beyond Arizona. If 
the justices had ruled in favor of the 
plaintiffs, the case was expected to overturn 
California's commission, since that state had 
similarly removed its legislature from the 
vast majority of the district-drawing process. 
Eleven other states -- Connecticut, Hawaii, 
Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Montana, New 
Jersey, New York, Ohio and Washington -- 
also have commissions, though their 
lawmakers are more involved in the process. 
 
The court's minority argued there is a "critical 
difference" between Arizona, where citizens 
"supplanted the legislature altogether," and 
other states whose independent commissions 
"supplement" the legislature's role. But the 
court's majority said a ruling against the 
commission would have affected how 
elections are conducted in states beyond 
Arizona. 
 
"Banning lawmaking by initiative to direct a 
State’s method of apportioning congressional 
districts would not just stymie attempts to 
curb gerrymandering," it wrote. "It would 
also cast doubt on numerous other time, 
place, and manner regulations governing 
federal elections that States have adopted by 
the initiative method. As well, it could 
endanger election provisions in state 
constitutions adopted by conventions and 
ratified by voters at the ballot box, without 
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involvement or approval by 'the 
Legislature.'" 
 
Would-be challengers to the representatives 
of Arizona's three competitive congressional 
districts -- Democratic Reps. Ann 
Kirkpatrick and Kyrsten Sinema and GOP 
Rep. Martha McSally -- had held off on 
jumping into those races for 2016 until the 
Supreme Court issued its decision. 
 
 
 
